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THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
1 CASE NO. WL? b c  
1 
) VEFUFIED PETITION FOR POST- 




1. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
1. Petitioner, Shane McKay, is currently incarcerated at the Saint Anthony Work Center in Saint 
Anthony, Idaho. 
2. Mr. McKay is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
State of Idaho, County of Canyon, the Honorable Renae J. Hoff, presiding. 
3. The Canyon County District Court Number for that case is CR-2003-21789*C. 
4. Mr. McKay was charged with one count of Felony Vehicular Manslaughter. 
5. Following a jury trial, Mr. McKay was found guilty of the vehicular manslaughter charge. 
6. Mr. McKay was represented in the District Court by attorney Richard L. Harris. 
1 . VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
7. The District Court sentenced Mr. McKay to a unified term of ten years with a minimum 
period of confinement of four years. 
8. Mr. McKay filed a Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction in his sentence, which the 
District Court denied. 
9. Mr. McKay appealed from the sentence and the District Court's denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
10. Attorney Jason C. Pintler represented Mr. McKay on appeal. 
11. On November 22,2006, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence and the District 
Court's denial of the Rule 35 motion. 
12. A petition for review filed by Mr. McKay is pending before the Idaho Supreme Court. 
13. With respect to this conviction, Mr. McKay has not filed any other petitions for post- 
conviction relief. 
11. FIRST CAUSE O F  ACTION: Petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel at Trial 
14. The state alleged that Mr. McKay committed vehicular manslaughter because he killed Ted 
Cox by operating a motor vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol 
concentration in excess of 0.08. 
15. Mr. Hams requested a jury instruction, which provided that Mr. McKay was guilty of 
vehicular manslaughter if he unlawfully drove a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and the 
unlawful operation of the vehicle caused the death of Mr. Cox. 
16. The district court instructed the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty of vehicular manslaughter if 
he was driving while under the influence of alcohol, or while having an alcohol concentration in excess 
of 0.08; and the his operation of the vehicle caused the death of Mr. Cox. 
2 VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
17. At a jury instruction conference, Mr. Harris informed the district court that he was not 
requesting a jury instruction on the element of cause. 
18. The jury found Mr. McKay guilty. 
111. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel on Appeal 
19. That a Notice of Appeal from the District Court sentence was filed. 
20. That the State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent Mr. McKay. 
21. On September 20,2006, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender Jason C. Pintler filed the 
appellant's brief, in which he argued that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence and denying Mr. McKay's Rule 35 motion for reduction in the sentence. 
22. Attorney Pintler did not raise any other issues on direct appeal. 
23. On November 22,2006, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished opinion affirming Mr. 
McKay's sentence and the District Court's denial of the Rule 35 motion. 
IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief: 
A. That the conviction be vacated. 
B. That the judgment be withdrawn and then reentered so that Petitioner will have 42 days in 
which to file a new notice of appeal. 
f i  
Respectfully submitted this f i  day of January, 2007 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney fo; Shane McKay 
3 VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
40000104 
VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Shane McKay, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
1. I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and that the 
matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
4 VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
3POOOOS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
cfi 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this& day of January, 2007, I caused a true and correct copy of 




to: Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Dennis Benjamin 
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Dennis Benjamin 
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P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 ( f )  
Attorneys for the Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
NO. W04- ~HCI 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT 
DISCOVERY 
Petitioner, Shane McKay, asks this Court for its Order granting permission for him to 
conduct discovery. As explained below, discovery is appropriate in this case because it is 
necessary to protect the "substantive rights" of petitioner. See Grgfith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 
375,825 P.2d 94,98 (Ct. App. 1992). While discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings 
is a matter put to the sound discretion of the District Court, it would be an abuse of discretion to 
deny discovery where the petitioner has identified the type of information that he or she may 
obtain through discovery and explained how that information could affect the disposition of his 
or her application for post-conviction relief. Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 3 1 1 , 3  19,912 P.2d 
679,687 (Ct. App.1996). 
1 . PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 
In this case, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during 
trial and on direct appeal. Therefore, evidence regarding the reasons underlying counsels' 
performance is necessary to develop Petitioner's claims 
In particular, Petitioner seeks to take the deposition of Attorneys Richard Harris and 
Justin Curtis to determine the following: 
1. Was Attorney Harris aware that the jury instructions given by the District 
Court were inconsistent with the approved pattern Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions? 
2. Had Attorney Harris reviewed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in State v. McNair, 
141 Idaho 263, 108 P.3d 410 (Ct. App. 2005)? 
3. What reasons did Attorney Harris have for acquiescing to jury instructions that 
omitted the elements of cause and intent? 
4. What reasons did Attorney Pintler have for failing to raise the erroneous jury 
instructions as an issue on direct appeal 
5. What reasons did Attorney Pintler have for challenging only the length of 
Petitioner's sentence? 
The answers to these questions are all relevant to Petitioner's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel against Attorneys Harris and Pintler. Mr. McKay claims Attorney Harris's 
performance fell below reasonable professional standards because he acquiesced to jury 
instructions that omitted elements of the charged offense. Mr. McKay claims Attorney Pintler's 
performance fell below reasonable professional standards because he failed to raise the erroneous 
jury instructions as an issue on direct appeal. The reasons why these facts are central to 
Petitioner's claims are set out in the Memorandum in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief contemporaneously filed. 
2 PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 
As shown above, discovery is needed to protect Mr. McKay's substantial rights and the 
motion for permission to conduct discovery should be granted. 
1P Respectfully submitted this - day of January 2007. 
Dennis Benjamin I 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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000009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on .January / 2007, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be: 
F- 
- hand delivered 
- faxed 
to: Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1 1 15 Albany 
Caldweli. ID 83605 
Dennis Benjamin 




Ril P M 
Dennis Benjamin 
ISBA# 4 199 JAid 1 9 2007 
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) THAT THE COURT TAKE 
vs. 1 JUDICIAL NOTICE 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Respondent. 1 
Shane McKay asks this Court, pursuant to DRE 201(d), to take judicial notice of the 
following adjudicative facts: 
1 The files and records in the case of State v. Shane McKay, No. CR-03-2 1789*C. 
2. The file, record, transcripts and exhibits in State v. Shane McKay, Idaho Supreme 
Court Docket No. 31652. * 
Dated this day of January 2007. 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
1. PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on January A 2007, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be 
mailed 
- hand deIivered 
- faxed 
to: Canyon County Prosecutor 
1 11 5 Albany 
Caldwell, Di) 83605 
Dennis Benjamin 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
1 
) MEMORANDUM IN 
1 SUPPORT OF VERIFIED 
) PETITION FOR POST- 




Petitioner Shane McKay was charged with felony vehicular manslaughter, LC. 5 18- 
4006(3)(b). Following a jury trial during which Richard L. Harris represented Mr. McKay, the 
jury found Mr. McKay guilty of felony vehicular manslaughter. This Court sentenced Mr. 
McKay to a unified term of ten years with a minimum period of confinement of four years. Mr. 
McKay filed an LC.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which this Court denied. 
Mr. McKay appealed from the sentence and this Court's denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
Jason C. Pintler, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, was appointed to represent Mr. 
McKay. Attomey Pintler filed a brief arguing that this Court abused its discretion by imposing 
1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
an excessive sentence and by denying Mr. McKay's Rule 35 motion. In an unpublished opinion, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. McKay's sentence and the denial of the Rule 35 motion. 
See State v. McKay, Docket No. 3 1652 (Ct. App. Nov. 22,2006). 
Mr. McKay has filed the instant action asserting that he is entitled to post-conviction 
relief. Specifically, for the reasons set forth below, Mr. McKay contends that neither Attorney 
Harris nor Attorney Pintler provided effective assistance of counsel. 
A. Mr. McKay did not Receive the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial. 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 , s  
13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal case the effective assistance of 
counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal 
constitution, is analyzed under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). Pursuant to Strickland, a petitioner will prevail when he proves: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance, 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. St~icklarzd, 466 U.S. at 689. 
A defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of a diligent, conscientious 
advocate. Wmk v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 157, 857 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, 
counsel performs deficiently when his performance falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277,971 P.2d 727,730 (1998); Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner meets the prejudice prong 
by showing there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have been obtained in 
the case if the attorney had acted properly. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
2 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
In this case, Attorney Richard Hams performed deficiently because he failed to object to 
jury instructions that omitted the element of cause and allowed the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty 
of a strict liability offense. Mr. McKay was prejudiced by Attorney Harris's deficient 
performance because, had the jury been properly instructed, there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would have acquitted Mr. McKay. Accordingly, this Court should grant Mr. McKay's 
Petition for Post-conviction Relief. 
1. Defense Counsel's Performance Was Deficient Because He Failed to Obiect to 
Clearlv Erroneous Jurv Instructions. 
Attorney Hams's performance fell below objective standards of competence because 
neither the jury instruction he requested nor the instruction given by the District Court required 
the jury to conclude that the death resulted from Mr. McKay's culpable conduct. A jury 
instruction that lightens the prosecution's burden of proof by omitting an element of the crime 
violates a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); 
State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43,47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000); see also State v. 
Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663,666,84 P.3d 599,602 (Ct. App. 2004). The failure to permit the jury 
to determine whether the state had proved every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
also violated Mr. McKay's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1 (1999). Accordingly, Attorney Harris's acquiescence to jury instructions, which removed 
essential elements of the crime charged from the jury's consideration, constituted deficient 
performance. See also State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54,58,921 P.2d 754, 758 (Ct. App. 1996). 
3 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
a. The jury was allowed to find Mr. McKay guilty of a strict liability offense. 
Idaho law requires a mental state of at least simple negligence before an individual may 
be convicted of vehicular manslaughter. State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263,267, 108 P.3d 410,414 
(Ct. App. 2005). In McNair, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the crime of vehicular 
manslaughter may be a strict liability offense. McNair, 141 Idaho at 265, 108 P.3d at 412. In 
determining that misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter requires negligent conduct, the Court 
noted that the legislature had enacted LC. 5 18-4012, which defines when homicide is excusable, 
and I.C. § 18-201(3), which defines persons capable of committing crimes. By enacting those 
statutes, the legislature expressed its intent that a death occurring by accident and without 
negligence or other culpable behavior is not a criminal homicide. McNair, 141 Idaho at 267, 108 
P.3d at 414. 
The jury in McNair was instructed to find the defendant guilty if it concluded that, while 
operating a motor vehicle, he failed to maintain a lane of travel and that his operation of the 
vehicle in an unlawful manner caused a death. Because the jury was instructed to find the 
defendant guilty based solely on his failure to maintain his lane of travel, even if such failure was 
not a product of negligence or other culpable conduct, the Court concluded the jury instruction 
was erroneous. McNair, 141 Idaho at 269, 108 P.3d at 416. 
Similarly, both the jury instruction requested by Attorney Harris and the one given by the 
District Court allowed the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty based solely on the concIusion he 
committed the offense of driving under the influence (DUI) and his operation of the vehicle 
caused a death. A person commits a DUI by driving while under the influence of alcohol or 
4 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
drugs or by having a breath or blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08, regardless of 
whether the person knew or should have known that he or she was impaired or had a sufficiently 
elevated blood alcohol concentration. See LC. 5 18-8004. Thus, like the failure to maintain a 
lane of travel, the offense of DUI does not require that the proscribed conduct be committed with 
culpable intent. 
Therefore, contrary to the Court of Appeals holding in McNair that vehicular 
manslaughter cannot be a strict liability offense, the jury instructions in this case allowed the jury 
to find Mr. McKay guilty regardless of whether the jury found that the accident was the result of 
his culpable conduct. It was objectively unreasonable for Mr. Hams to acquiesce to jury 
instructions that omitted the element of intent from the charged offense and created a strict 
liability offense. 
b. The jury was not instructed regarding the element ofcause. 
The state was required to prove not only that Mr. McKay committed a DUI and there was 
an accident resulting in death, but also that Mr. McKay's commission of a DUI was the cause of 
the accident resulting in death. See State v. Thomas, 128 Idaho 906,908,920 P.2d 927,929 (Ct. 
App. 1996). Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 709 clarifies this concept by indicating that "the 
defendant's operation of the vehicle in such unlawful manner was a significant cause 
contributing to the death." (Emphasis added.) Because the Idaho Supreme Court approved the 
pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, they are presumptively correct. State v. Hopper, 142 
Idaho 512,514, 129 P.3d 1261,1263 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 
373,376, 93 P.3d 704,707 (Ct. App. 2004). 
5 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
Here, the jury instructions deviated from the pattern instructions, omitted the phrase "in 
such unlawful manner" and, thus, failed to connect Mr. McKay's commission of a DUI with the 
death. Instead, the jury was permitted to find Mr. McKay guilty regardless of whether the jury 
concluded that the fact Mr. McKay committed a DUI had anything to do with the accident. 
Moreover, Idaho law provides that a person commits behicular manslaughter only when 
the unlawful operation of the vehicle was a signzjicant cause of the death. LC. 5 18-4006(3); 
ICJI 709. Neither Mr. McKay's requested jury instruction nor the district court's instruction 
informed the jury that, in order to commit vehicular manslaughter, the state must prove that the 
operation of the vehicle in an unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to a death. 
The concept of "significant cause" embodies the rule that to constitute vehicular homicide 
there must be a causal connection between the death and the defendant's driving so that the act 
was a proximate cause of the resulting death. See Wash. Pattern Jury Instructions Crim 90.07; 
Miller v. State, 513 S.E. 2d 27,30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). The tern "proximate cause" means a 
cause which, in direct sequence unbroken by any new independent cause, produces the death and 
without which the death would not have happened. Wash. Pattern Jury Instructions Crim 90.07. 
Thus, even though contributory negligence is not a defense to vehicular manslaughter, an 
intoxicated defendant can avoid responsibility for a death resulting from the defendant's driving 
if the death was caused by a superseding event. State v. Souther, 998 P.2d 350,355 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
By failing to inform the jury that Mr. McKay was guilty of vehicular manslaughter only if 
his commission of a DUI was a signz3cant cause of the accident resulting in death, the jury was 
6 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERJFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
permitted to find Mr. McKay guilty even if the death would have occurred notwithstanding Mr. 
McKay's culpable conduct. Thus, the jury instructions in this case impermissibly lightened the 
state's burden of proof. 
Attorney Hams acknowledged that the element of cause was a significant issue. 
Inexplicably, Attorney Hams nonetheless informed the District Court that he did not intend to 
request that the jury be instructed regarding the element of cause. Thus, the jury was simply 
instructed that Mr. McKay was guilty if his operation of the vehicle caused the death. Attorney 
Harris failed to perform in an objectively reasonable manner by acquiescing to jury instructions 
that omitted the element of cause from the charged offense. 
c. Conclusion 
The jury instructions given in this case described a strict liability offense and relieved the 
state of its burden to prove that a death resulted from Mr. McKay's culpable conduct. Moreover, 
the instructions failed to describe the cause element by informing the jury that to be guilty of 
vehicular manslaughter, the fact that Mr. McKay was driving under the influence caused the 
accident resulting in death. 
Attorney Harris's decision to not challenge jury instructions that omitted elements of the 
offense carnot be attributed to a strategic decision and must have been based on ignorance of the 
law or other shortcoming capable of objective evaluation. Therefore, Attorney Harris's 
performance in failing to object to these clearly erroneous jury instructions fell beneath objective 
standards of competence. 
7 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
2. Mr. McKav Was Preiudiced bv Defense Counsel's Performance Because, Had the Jury 
Been ProperlvInstructed, There Is a Reasonable Probabilitv Mr. McKav Would Have 
Been Acauitted. 
Mr. McKay was prejudiced by the jury instruction, which omitted elements of the offense 
unless the guilty verdict "was surely unattributable to the error." See State v. Thompson, 143 
Idaho 155, 158, 139 P.3d 757, 760 (Ct. App. 2006), citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
279 (1993). A defendant is prejudiced when a jury is not instructed as to an element of an 
offense and the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding in favor of the 
defendant with respect to the omitted element. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999); 
Thompson, 143 Idaho at 158, 139 P.3d at 760. Therefore, a defendant meets the prejudice prong 
when an essential element of the offense is at issue and counsel performs deficiently by 
acquiescing to an instruction that removes that element from the jury's consideration. Gittins, 
129 Idaho at 58,921 P.2d at 758. 
Additionally, Attorney Harris's deficient performance in acquiescing to the erroneous 
jury instructions deprived Mr. McKay of the opportunity to have those instructions reviewed on 
direct appeal. See State v. Anderson, -Idaho -, - P.3d __ (Ct. App. 2006), 2006 WL 
2974049. Mr. Harris's failure to object to the clearly erroneous jury instruction constituted 
deficient performance. See Anderson, Docket 2006 WL 2974049, at n.3. Mr. McKay was 
prejudiced by this deficient performance. Had Mr. Harris made a proper objection to the jury 
instructions, the Court would have either: 1) given the correct instructions, and Mr. McKay 
would have been acquitted; or 2) the jury instruction issue would have been raised in Mr. 
McKay's direct appeal, and Mr. McKay would have been granted a new trial by the Court of 
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Appeals. 
B. Alternatively, Mr. McKay did not Receive the Effective Assistance of Counsel on 
Appeal. 
Mr. McKay acknowledges that any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, 
but was not, may not be raised in a post-conviction petition. LC. § 19-490I(b). If this Court 
were to find that the jury instruction errors set forth above could have been raised on direct 
appeal, notwithstanding the rule in State v. Anderson, supra, then the failure to raise those claims 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. (The Idaho Supreme Court has accepted 
review of the Court of Appeals's opinion in Anderson and, as will be explained below, there are 
strong reasons why the Court of Appeals opinion should be overruled.) 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right to effective assistance of counsel on his or her first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387 (1985); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,765,760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). The 
Strickland test generally applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. See Roe 
v. Flores-Orlega, 528 U.S. 470,476-77 (2000). 
In order to perform in an objectively reasonable manner, appellate counsel must make a 
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be 
made. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280,285,32 P.3d 672,677 (Ct. App. 2001); LaBelle v. State, 
130 Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App. 1997). The prejudice prong is met when the 
defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the appeal would have been different. Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277,971 P.2d at 730. 
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As discussed in Section A above, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by jury instructions, which 
defined a strict liability offense and omitted the element of cause. Attorney Pintler nevertheless 
failed to raise the erroneous jury instructions as an issue on direct appeal. Moreover, because the 
issue was meritorious, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by Attorney Pintler's deficient performance. 
As a general matter, courts will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and 
tactical choices. State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546,551,21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). However, this 
rule does not apply to counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. 
Rather than arguing that the District Court erred by misinstructing the jury, which was the 
best argument to be made, Attorney Pintler argued that the District Court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction in sentence. In 
order to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, and thus an abuse of the court's 
discretion, the defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66,70, 106 
P.3d 392,396 (2005). Such challenges are rarely successful. See Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho at 71, 
106 P.3d at 397; State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 666, 99 P.3d 616,619 (2004); State v. Jeppesen, 
138 Idaho 71, 76,57 P.3d 782, 787 (2002); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462, 50 P.3d 472,477 
(2002); State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 897, 980 P.2d 552, 561 (1999). 
Experienced counsel frequently winnow out weaker arguments on appeal for the sake of 
focusing on key issues. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 75 1-52. However, this principle is inapplicable in 
cases such as the instant one, where the only issue raised on appeal was whether the District 
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Court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences. Therefore, there could be no 
strategic or tactical reason to forego challenging the erroneous jury instructions for the sake of 
focusing the Court's attention on the sentencing challenge. By failing to file a brief in support of 
the best argument to be made, Attorney Pintler performed in an objectively unreasonable manner. 
Even though Attorney Harris failed to preserve the jury instruction error by objecting in 
the District Court, this error would have been reviewable under the doctrine of fundamental 
error. "Fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights, goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which 
was essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit to be waived." 
Statev. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 616,623,130 P.3d 1154,1161 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The requirement that the state prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process. In re Winship, supra; Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,277-78 (1993); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43,47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 
(Ct. App. 2000). Jury instructions that omit an element of the crime violate this guarantee by 
lightening the prosecution's burden of proof. Crowe, 135 Idaho at 47, 13 P.3d at 1260; see also 
State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184, 186 (Wash. 2001) (instructions allowing conviction without finding 
an essential element of the crime charged relieves state of its burden to prove all elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and thus, the error implicates the constitutional right to a fair trial). 
Accordingly, the failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is 
fundamental error, which is reviewable on appeal notwithstanding the absence of an objection in 
the trial court. State v. Osborne, 808 P.2d 624,631-32 (N.M. 1991); Gabbert v. State, 141 P.3d 
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690,695 (Wyo. 2006). The omission ofjury instructions defining the elements of intent and 
cause therefore constituted fundamental error that would have been reviewable for the first time 
on appeal. 
Moreover, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by Attorney Pintler's failure to raise the erroneous 
jury instruction on direct appeal. As discussed above in Section A, Mr. McKay was prejudiced 
by thc omission of instructions describing the essential elements of the charged offense. Because 
the District Court deviated from the jury instructions previously approved by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, there was considerable risk that the verdict finding Mr. McKay guilty would have been 
overturned on appeal. See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,647,962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). 
The failure to instruct the jury on all the elements of a criminal offense also violates the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Neder, supra. Accordingly, there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the jury instruction issue been raised, the result of Mr. McKay's 
direct appeal would have been different. 
Mr. McKay acknowledges that in State v, Anderson, - Idaho -9 - P.3d (Ct. 
App. 2006), 2006 WL 2974049, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a claim of fundamental 
error concerning jury instructions may not be raised for the first time on appeal because it would 
render the relevant provisions of I.C.R. 30 (b) "a nullity." 2006 WL 2974049*4. (Rule 30 (b), as 
amended effective July of 2004, provides in part that "No party may assign as error the giving of 
or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires or considers 
its verdict.") 
However, Anderson was decided on October 19,2006. Because Attorney Pintler filed his 
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opening brief on September 20,2006, Anderson does not provide a basis for his failure to raise 
the jury instruction error as an issue on appeal. At the time the opening brief was filed in Mr. 
McKay's appeal, the jury instruction issue could have been raised for the first time on appeal 
under the fundamental error doctrine. 
Moreover, Mr. Anderson's petition for review was granted by the Supreme Court on 
January 18,2007. Mr. McKay believes that Anderson was wrongly decided and that the decision 
of the Court of Appeals will be overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court because the Court of 
Appeals has misinterpreted I.C.R. 30(b). 
There is no support for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that, by subjecting jury 
instruction claims to the general rule that objections must first be made in the trial court, the 
amendment to I.C.R. 30 was intended to exempt such claims from the exception of fundamental 
error. Indeed, there is evidence supporting the contrary conclusion. Attached as Exhibit A to 
this Memorandum is a copy of the Minutes of the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee meeting 
held on November 21,2003. During this meeting, the amendment to I.C.R. 30(b) was discussed. 
The discussion concerning the proposed rule change to LC.R. 30 (b) is set forth at pages six and 
seven of the exhibit. 
According to the Committee Minutes, Michael Henderson, then a Deputy Attorney 
General and now Legal Counsel to the Supreme Court, submitted a letter to the Committee 
setting out the arguments in support of the rule change. On page seven of that letter, in the first 
full paragraph, Mr. Henderson noted that "[elven if there is no objection, fundamental error 
arguments would still be preserved." Id. Thus, the Committee Minutes show that while the rule 
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change was believed to be necessary to eliminate unobjected-to trial error from being raised on 
appeal, the rule was not intended to eliminate fundamental error claims. 
This conclusion is confirmed by a follow-up letter from Mr. Henderson to the Supreme 
Court. After the November 21, 2003, meeting, Mr. Henderson followed up with a letter to 
Justice Burdick, the Chairman of the Criminal Rules Committee. This letter restated and 
expanded the arguments Mr. Henderson had previously made in support of the proposed 
amendment to I.C.R. 30. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit B. In the middle of the first 
full paragraph on page 2, Mr. Henderson states that: 
Some courts hold that all objections to jury instmctions not raised to the trial court 
are waived. Most courts hold that, in the absence of a trial objection to jury 
instmctions, the appellate court will review only for clear or fundamental error, or 
will otherwise require an elevated appellate standard. This Iatter mfe is the one 
that would be consistent with Idaho's approach to the preservation of issues for 
appeal, and is the one that should be adopted. 
Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Henderson, in other words, urged rejection of the mle adopted by the 
Anderson Court and urged the Court to continue to permit fundamental error to be raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
The long-standing rule in Idaho was, until Anderson, that fundamental error in instructing 
the jury could be raised for the first time on appeal. In State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,486 P.2d 
260 (1971), for example, the Defendant was questioned at trial about his failure to disclose his 
alibi defense at the preliminary hearing. No objection to this questioning was made during the 
trial. The Court of Appeals held that even though no objection was made at trial, "In the case of 
fundamental error in a criminal case the Supreme Court may consider the same even though no 
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objection had been made at the time of trial." 91 Idaho at 251,486 P.2d at 262; see also, State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,62-63,90 P. 3d 278 (2003); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,277,77 
P.3d 956,966 (2003); State v. Headley, 130 Idaho 339,340-341,941 P. 3d 31 1,312-13 (1997); 
State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54,60-61, 896 P. 2d 962,968-69 (1995); State v. L a y ,  121 Idaho 
842,843-844,828 P. 2d 871,872-73 (1992). 
The Court of Appeals therefore erred by deyacto overruling these Supreme Court 
decisions even though it believed I.C.R. 30(b) compelled that result. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3,20 (1997) ("The Court of Appeals was correct in applying thle principle of stare 
decisis] despite disagreement with Albrecht, for it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule 
one of its precedents.") 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals has also held that fundamental error may be reviewed by 
the court on appeal even though an appropriate objection was not made at trial. See e.g., State v. 
Lopez, 141 Idaho 575,577, 114 P.3d 133, 135 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 
663,84 P.3d 599 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624,67 P.3d 103 (Ct. App. 2003); 
State v. Hollon; 126 Idaho 499,36 P.3d 1287 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,3 
P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Finally, the fundamental error doctrine is also entirely consistent with the trial court's 
statuto~y responsibility to instruct a jury as to all matters of law necessary for their information 
imposed by LC. $ 19-2132. Thus, it is the duty of the court, not the defendant, to instruct the 
jury on the essential elements of a crime. See Osborne, 808 P.2d at 631-32. The orderly and 
equitable administration ofjustice requires that appellatecourts correct fundamental error 
15 MEMORANDUM IN SUpPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
notwithstanding the defendant's failure to object to the error. Id. Accordingly, if an objection is 
required before the trial court's statutory duty pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2132 may be enforced in the 
appellate courts, then it is this statute that has been rendered a nullity by the Anderson decision. 
For these reasons, Mr. McKay asserts that Anderson was wrongly decided and will be reversed 
by the Supreme Court. 
Attorney Jason Pintler performed deficiently by failing to raise the erroneous jury 
instruction as an issue on direct appeal. Mr. McKay was prejudiced by this performance because 
there is a reasonable probability he would have prevailed on appeal had the issue been raised. 
C.  Conclusion. 
The Court should grant the petition and: 
1. Vacate Mr. McKay's judgment of conviction and sentence; 
2. In the alternative, enter an amended judgment of conviction, which would allow Mr. 
McKay to file a new direct appeal with the effective assistance of counsel. 
3. Grant such other relief as the Court may find just in the circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted this - day of January 2007. 
Attorney fo; Shane ~ c ~ a ~  
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to: Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1 11 5 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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CR,TMINAL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 21,2003, MEETING 
Present: Justice Roger Burdick, Chair; Michael Henderson, Grant Loebs, Scott Axline, -
Gar Hackney, Denise Rosen, Art Bistline, Amil Myshin, Judge Ron Wilper, Judge 
Stephen Calhoun, Penny Friedlander, Molly Husky, Bill Douglas, Ann Mane Kelso, and 
Cathy Derden. 
I.C.R. 33.1 on Death Penaitv Procedures. 
Due to the new statutory provisions on sentencing by a jury in death penalty cases, some 
revisions were needed to these two mles. The changes that are recommended to I.C.R. 
33.1 are as follows: 
Amend the title ofRule 33.1 to make it clear it only addresses the situation where a jury 
is waived at sentencing and the court has to make the findings. 
Strike section (a) of the current mle 33.1 since the statute now provides that no PSI is 
requested for these special sentencing proceedings. If a speciaI sentencing proceeding is 
not held or one is held but no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt then the court may ordera PSI. 
Update citations to the statute and fill  in the former blanks in the rule that were for the 
offense so that the only offense referred to is murder in the first degree. The Committee 
noted that the new statute on jury sentencing only addresses the crime of murder in the 
first degree and that sentencing in kidnapping cases is still an issue but decided to 
conform the rule to the statute, LC. 19-2515. 
Change references to "hearing" to "special sentencing proceeding" 
Make additional changes in the form for findings to include in the opening paragraph that 
the jury has been waived. Strike the reference to "court appointed" counsel and just refer 
to counsel. In the section on.the hewing strike the reference to "notice to counsel" and 
change the language in the findings as to why the death penalty is imposed to reflect the 
language in the statute about the penalty not being unjust. 
The changes recommended are set out below: 
RULE 33.1 PROCEDURE WHERE DEATH PENALTY I 5  AUTHORIZED AND JURY I S  WAIVED 
FOR SPECIAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING 
(g b) Findings of the Trial Court in Capital Offenses. In  s~ecia l  sentenclnq 
the trial court shall Hieft make written findings as required by section 19- 
Idaho Code. The trial court shall serve copies of these written findings 
upon the defendant or defendant's counsel and the prosecuting attorney, 
(g e) Form of Findings, The Wrltten find~ngs of the trial court to be made after the 
special sentencing k&w proceeding 
shall be in substantially the Following form: 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
IN  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
Plaintiff, 
I 
)' FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN 
) CONS,IDERING DEATH PENALTY 
VS . ) UNDER SECTION 19-2515, 
, ) IDAHO CODE. 
Defendant. ) 
The above defendant having (been found guilty by a jury) (entered a plea of gullti) of 
the criminal offense of murder in the first dearee, which under the law authorizes the 
imposition of the'death penalty*, the iurv havina been waived, and the court having 
held a 
sentencing !+sfkg proceedinq for the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and 
argument of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense; 
NOW THEREFORE the court hereby makes the following Rndings: 
I. Conviction. That the defendant while represented by -counsel was 
found guilty of the offense of murder in the first dearee (by jury verdict) (pursuant to 
a plea of guilty). 
2.3, Sentencing Hearing. That a sentencing hearing was held on - 1 7  
R fP and that a t  said hearing, in the presence of the 
defendant, the court'heard relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the 
offense and arguments of counsel. 
3 4. Facts and Arguments Found in Mitigation. - 
[Summarlze and Itemize] 
4 6 .  Facts and Arguments Found in Aggravation. 
[Summarize and Iternlzel 
~. . , ... . -  
. ,  . . .  . ~ 
5 6; statutory Aggravating ~ i rcumst~nce i~ound  U er Section 19-2i15@ a Idaho -
Code. 
[Describe in detail if a n y  are found.] 
7. ~easons  Why Death Penalty Was Imposed. 
. . 
[Set forth the finding and reasons why the court flnds no rnitioatina circumstances 
wouid make the imoosition of the deatbenaitv un ius t  
OR 
8.Reasons Why Death Penalty Was Not Imposed. 
[Set forth finding why court finds the mitigating 
circumstances outweigh the gravity of any 
aggravating circumstances so as to make 
unjust the imposition of the death penalty.] 
CONCLUSION 
That the death penalty (should) ('should not) be imposed on the defendant For the 




Fax Filine of Sheriff s Certificates. 
Judge Williamson, Administrative District Judge for the Fourth District, requested that 
the Committee look at amending the rule on fax filings to address the potential for 
fraud that cul~ently exists by allowing the fax filing of sheriff's certificates or other 
documents proving incarceration when exoneration of a bond is being sought. A 
number of Committee members expressed consensus that court administrative offices 
do in fact have concerns that these certificates are easy to alter and that alteration is 
harder to detect when the document is faxed. The Committee recognized that 
preventing fax filings of these documents will not necessarily deter some one from 
filing a false document, but felt it would certainly make it harder. 
The Committee voted unanimously to recommend that the second sentence of 1.C.R 49 
(c) be amended as follows: 
''(c) Filing. Documents required to be served shall be filed with the court. Documents 
shall be filed in the manner provided in civil actions. Any document, except an 
information or complaint, a search warrant, a warrant of arrest, or a return on a warrant or 
. . 
service df a search warrant, or hvdocument filed as proof o~inearceration of a aarty to 
thd action, may be transmitted to the court for filing' by a facsimile machine process." 
. . 
I.C.R. 4(e) and I.C.R. 41(c 
The Committee was asked to look at the different language relating to affidavits for arrest 
and affidavits for a search warrant as set out in I.C.R. 4(e) and I.C.R. 41(c), In the rule 
on probable cause for an arrest it does not say the affidavit has to be sworn before the 
judge or magistrate, but the rule on issuance of a search warrant requires the affidavit to 
be sworn before the judge. After discussion there was a consensus that there was a 
practical difference in the types of wmants and that there was no problenl that needed to 
be addressed. No action was recommended. 
No Contact Orders as Condition of Probation and Transmittal of Information to 
Sheriffs 
1.C. 6 18-922 is entitled "Order-Transmittal to Law Enforcement Agency" and specifies 
that a no contact order issued as a cortdifion of bond is to be sent to the appropriate law 
enforcement agency and entered into ILETS. Criminal Rule 46.2 addresses no contact 
orders issued as a condition of release and directs that these orders are to be sent to the 
sheriffs office and entered into ILETS in accord with I.C. 5 18-922. 
The Conunittee was asked to consider no contact orders that are issued as a condition of 
probation as compared to a condition of bond. When no contact is included as a 
condition of probation the information is only included in the judgment sentencing the 
defendant and placing him on probation. When these judgments are provided to the 
sheriffs' offices they sometimes cause confusion because the no contact order is not on 
the fom~s they are used to seeing. Thus, the no contact orders entered as a condition of 
probation may not be getting entered in ILETS. The question considered was whether to 
amend I.C.R. 46.2 to also provide that no contact orders issued as a coridition of 
probation be sent to the sheriff for entry into ILETS. 
In the discussion it was noted that Judge Michael Redman has been doing an extensive 
study on no contact order procedures in Idaho and is making a number of 
recommendations to the Court regarding no conlact orders. Thus, the Committee did not 
want to make any recommendations that might conflict. The Committee did want to go 
on record though as supporting the requirement that any no contact order issued as a 
condition of probation also be sent to ILETS. 
The Committee also voiced support for Judge Redman's recommendation that tio contact 
orders have a time certain on them for expiration, and that any order dismissing or 
modifying a no contact order be sent immediately to the sheriffs department for entry in 
to LETS. A letter will be sent to Judge Redrnan expressing support for these 
recommendations. 
1.C.R 20 Transfer of cases 
Judge Stegner submitted this agenda item after he had a case where a woman was 
arrested in Latah County but lived in Kootenai County and wanted to have her case 
transferred to Kootenai so she could participate in the dn~g court program there. The 
, , 
. . lawyers involved brought .a motion to transfer under Rule .20, but. the current language 
does not fit this situation, as it only refers to a transfer for a defendant arrested or held in 
a county other than that in which the infomation.or indictment is pending and not to 
someone residing in a county other than that in which the charge is pending. Judge 
Stegner suggested that the rule be modified to  facilitate an inter-district transfer of a 
district court case by including the word %rpresentfi, as is in the federalcounterpart to 
this rule. Once someone is arrested and has bonded out he or she is going to be present in 
the home county. 
Several Committee members had experienced the same problenl and most were using the 
changeof venue rule to get around it, but all agreed that modifying the rule would be 
helpful and make it easier to transfer a case in order to allow someone to stay home and 
take advantage of participating in a drug court progTam. ' It was recommended that the 
words "or present" be added to the first line of the rule. 
Ln addition, the Committee recommended that approval of the court in the county where 
the action was pending be required in addition to the approval of the prosecutors that is  
already required. There would be no way to get the approval of the court where the case 
was being transferred as there would be no way of knowing which judge would have the 
case. 
Prosecutors on the Committee were concerned about having someone transferred to their 
county in order to take advantage of drug court and then not qualifying for drug court. 
All agreed that the approval ofthe prosecutor could be subject to conditions. The transfer 
is based .in the defendant agreeing to plead guilty and the rule already provides that the 
case will bereturned to the original county in the event a not guilty plea is entered. The 
Committee recommended that language be added that. the case would also be sent back 
upon failure to abide by conditions of transfer. By adding this language the prosecutors 
may put conditions on the transfer such as eligibility for drug court. 
The Ianguage in sections (a)(Z)and (a)3) was found to be repetitious and so it was 
recommended that these subsections be deleted. It was also suggested that the title to 
subsection (a)(l) be changed to reflect that it sets out the clerk's duties if the case is 
transferred. 
The Committee voted unanimously to recommend the rule be amended as follows: 
Rule 20. Transfer from the county for plea and sentence. 
(a) Complaint or indictment or information pending. A defendant arrested,~ h e l d ~ r  
in a county other than that in which the complaint, information, or indictment is 
pending against the defendant may state in writing that the defendant wishes to plead 
guilty to the complaint, information, or indictment which is pending and to consent to 
disposition of the case in the county in which the defendant was arrested,or is held& 
m, subject to the approval of the transfer by the prosecuting attorney fiom each 
county involved and the trial court where the case is amding. 
( H) -1erk's duties. Upon receipt of the defendant's request 
and consent and of the written approval of the prosecuting attorneys and the trial court 
yhere the case is  ending , the cierk of the court in which the complaint is pending shall 
transfer the papers and the proceeding or certified copies thereof to the clerk of the court 
for the county in which the defendant was arrested, or aAB is held or uresent; and the 
prosecution shall continue in that county. 
@ 8)  Effect of not guilty plea or failure to abide by conditions of transfer. 
If after the proceeding has been transfeced pursuant to subsection (a) of this rule the 
defendant pleads not guilty or fails to abide by the conditions of transfer, if any, the clerk 
shall return the papers to the court in which the prosecution was commenced and the 
proceeding shall be restored to the docket of the court. The defendant's statement that the 
defendant wished to plead guilty shall not be used against the defendant. 
( d-e) Summons. For the purpose of initiating a transfer under this mte a person who 
appeared in response to the summons issued under Rule 4 shall be treated as if that 
person had been arrested or held on a warrant in the county of such appearance. 
It was hrther suggested that a uniform form for transfer be developed. 
1.C.R 30&) and Obiections to JurvInstructions. 
This rule addresses' jury instructions and the discussion centered around whether the 
following sentence should be added: "No party may assign as error any portion of the 
charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the 
grounds for objection." Prior to 1980 the rule stated that an objection was required but 
the rule was amended in 1980 to delete this language and unfortunately there are no 
committee minutes or record as to why this change was made. In 1990 the Idaho 
Supreme Court held in State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225 (1990), that in view of the 
e 
ame~idnient hk failure to obiect to 'in instruction does not constitute a waiver of the issue 
on appeal. In a recent case, State v. McLeskev, 138 Idaho 691,69 P.3d 11 1 (2003), the 
Idaho Supreme Court discussed the rule and stated that in being asked to overrule Smith. 
it was really being asked to amend the mle and noted lhat criminal rules should be 
amended prospectively and not retroactively. 
Justice Burdick noted that the agenda item came to the Committee &om the Court of 
Appeals and not from the state. Michael Henderson submitted a letter to the Committee 
setting out arguments supporting the change that included the fact that as it now stands, 
the rule, which is interpreted not to require an objection, is contrary to the general rule 
that our appellate courts will not consider issues presented for the first time on appeal; 
that Idaho is the only jurisdiction that allows defendants to challenge instructions to 
which there was no objection; that objections are still required as to an omitted 
instruction; that invited error has beconle a confusing issue in these situations, and that 
the rule allows defense counsel to purposely refrain from objecting to instructions in 
order to preserve issues for appeal. This leads to a trial judge being deprived of 
arguments that could help provide the most accurate instructions. Even if there is no 
objection, fundamental error arguments would still be preserved. 
Other members of the Committee felt that the rule should not be amended because there 
often was not enough time to review instructions and articulate objections. Many felt 
instructions should be treated differently because it is the duty of the trial court to instruct 
the jury on the law such that any error in the instructions could be raised on appeal 
without an objection. Justice Burdick noted that one problem with the current rule is that 
it often leaves the court with the entire burden of doing the instructions. Requiring an 
objection would reapportion the responsibility for accurate instructions to the prosecutor, 
defense counsel and the court. 
Molly Husky discussed differences between issues of fundamental error, preserved error 
and harmless error. 
It was obvious that there were irreconcilable differences on this subject and a straw pdll 
was taken with the result being 6 in favor of changing the rule and 6 opposed, with one 
abstention. It was decided that that best way to present the issue to the court would be to 
have one person from each perspective submit a written letter setting out arguments for 
the members and the court to review. Michael Henderson had really already done this 
from the side of the state, and the Chair wanted to give defense counsel on the Committee 
the same opportunity. The letters will be circulated with the minutes and a ballot will be 
sent out on the issue. Both letters will be submitted to the Court with the minutes for the 
Court's consideration. 
Accommodating Hearing Impaired Jurors. 
The Committee received a copy of a memo that was written by Tom Frost at the request 
of Judge Darla Williamson on the issue of the state's obligation to provide a sign 
interpreter for a hearing-in~pairedldear juror, who is otherwise qualified to serve. One of 
the issues involved is how to protect the sanctity of the jury if an interpreter is allowed 
into the jury room. The memo indicates that the Fourth District is handling the issue at 
. . 
the local level by alIbwing an interpreter to accompany ajuroiaRer signing an oath. The 
question for the committee waswhether a statewide rule should be adopted to address the 
issue. 
There was concern about an interpreter who used signing being in the jury room because 
of the fact that this is not a literal translation, and various fornls of technology were 
discussed. Members were more comfortable with the idea of having a court reporter 
who used real time reporting so that the juror could read what was being said on a screen 
and other jurors would know that what they said was being literally reported. 
The consensus was that this Committee did not have the expertise needed in this area to 
make a recommendation and that this might be an issue better left at the local level now 
as it presents adn~inislrative problems. It was also recommended that the issue be 
referrcd to the Fairness and Equality Committee. 
Victims Rights 
The Committee had received a letter from MADD suggesting that the Committee 
consider a rule requiring courts to ask prosecutors if crime victims had been notified of - 
their tights and of ;he court proceedings. 
After discussion the consensus was that prosecutors are aware of this duty that is required 
of them and that any omissions are due to oversight. It was felt that it is not the role of 
the courts to check on prosecutors and it would take away from the court's appearance of 
impartiality. 
It was decided that no rule change was needed and that Justice Burdick would write a 
letter to MADD explaining the Committee's position. 
Rule 24 and Trial Jurors. 
The Committee was asked to review the removal of jurors by lot and to clarify when 
alternate jurors had to be sequestered. Subsection d(1) states that those removed by lot 
may be discharged afier the jury retires to consider its verdict, unless the court otherwise 
directs as provided below. Subsection d(2) then provides that if the court determines that 
those jurors removed by lot must be available then the bailiff, sheriff, or other person 
appointed by the court shall take custody of the jurors until discharged by the court. 
Some judges have interpreted this language to mean that the alternate juror always has to 
be sequestered until the jury finishes its deliberations because there is always the chance 
the alternate may be needed. Other judges have let the alternate leave with instructions 
not to discuss the case in the event he or she is later needed. 
If the jury is sequestered then the alternate must also be sequestered, but in your average 
case it was felt that there should be a way to release the alternate with appropriate 
instructions. 
The committee voted unanimously to recommend the following amendment to (d)(2): 
'.Jurors removed by lot, If the court determines that those jurors removed by lot must be 
available to replace any jurors who may be excused during deliberations due to death, 
illness or otherwise as determined by the court, &gi the bailiff, sheriff, or other person 
appointed by the court shall take custody of the sai$- removed jUJ0rS until discharged by 
the court; however. if the iurv has not been sequestered then the jurors removed by lot 
may be released by (he court with appropriate instructions." 
There was further discussion as to the system of removing jurors by lot. Some members 
found this made it harder to exercise peremptories and were concerned about not 
knowing which of the jurors would be the actual twelve deciding the case until the very 
end. Most of the members indicated a desire for the parties to know who the alternates 
would be at an earlier stage in the trial even if the jurors themselves were not made 
aware of this fact. The Committee did not have access to the Jury Committee report that 
resulted in the removal by lot system, but it was the Committee's understanding that the 
change was to make sure that all the jurors stayed involved in the case. There was a 
motion to strike the removal by lot system in the rules but that motion failed in a 5 to 8 
vote. 
The now provides that jurors be moved by lot at the conclusion of closing arguments 
and there was a motion to change this sentence to provide that the jurors be moved "at a 
time prior to deliberations" to allow flexibility to do it earlier. The idea was still that only 
the parties would be aware of who the alternates were if they were designated at an 
earlier time. The Committee then voted to table the issue until further study could be 
done and the Jury Committee report reviewed, and it was suggested that a conference call 
could be held on this at a future time. 
It was also noted that there may be a need for a rule addressing the removal of alternate 
jurors in death penalty cases since after deliberations and return of a guilty verdict the 
jury would have to be present for the sentencing proceeding. Jurors removed before 
deliberations at the guilt phase would have to be present during the sentencing phase. 
I.C.R. 5. Initial Aooearance 
The Committee was asked to review whether the time frames set out in the rule as to the 
initial appearance and determination of probable cause conflicted or needed clarifying. 
The consensus was lhat the rule was clear and no action was taken. 
Reinstatement of I.C.R. 25 
The Committee received a letter fron~ the Idaho Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers requesting the reinstatement of Rule 25, the disqualification of judges without 
cause. The IACDL argues that citizens facing a deprivation of liberty deserve the same 
tactical tools available to businesses and individuals involved in civil cases, and asserted 
that reinstatement of the rule would not cause undue delay or unjustified expense. 
When Idaho had the rule it was part of a very small minority of states that allowed a 
disqualification without cause in a criminal case. A public defender or prosecutor who 
consistently disqualifies a judge that they have to appear before on a daily basis can 
really effect the system more so than a practitioner in a civil case and there was also 
concern over disenkanchising voters. However, it was argued that there are sometimes 
good reasons to avoid certain judges, that both sides have a fundamental tight to a fair 
trial, and that administrative concerns should not be elevated over the fairness of the trial. 
Defense counsel stated that having the rule was helpful in dealing with defendants and 
without ever exercising the rule made it appear they had some control. Almost all of the 
members said they had never disqualified a judge without cause when the rule existed 
and believed the rule was suspended due to a few persons in one or two counties. 
There was a suggestion that the rule be reinstated with a caveat that an administrative 
district judge could temporarily suspend the rule in any district where in the ADJ's 
opinion the rule was being abused and adversely impacting the administration of justice. 
However, there was concern that this type of a condition could give rise to an equal 
~rotection argument and cause other problems. 
Grant Loebs stated that he had talked to the leadership of the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys 
Association and, like the IACDL, they were in favor of reinstating the rule. 
The ~om&ttee voted unanimously to recommend that Rule 25 be reinstated. 
I.C.R. 33(c 1 on plea withdrawal. 
Currently the mie does not have a time limit on motions to withdraw a guilty plea, but in 
a recent case, State v. Jakoski, 2003 WL 22439868 (Oct.29, 2003)' the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated that absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction the trial court's 
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, 
either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment. In this case, the 
court held that, since Jakoski did not appeal his judgment, then it became final 42 days 
later and the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider his motion to withdraw his plea 
that was filed after this time frame. 
in response to this case, Molly Husky proposed that Rule 33(c) be amended to set out an 
extended time frame to file a motion to withdraw a plea, suggesting it be either I20 days 
similar to a Rule 35 motion, or 180 days. The Committee agreed that there was an 
inference in Jakoski that the mle could be amended, but a number of questions arose as to 
why there should be additional time aIlowed to withdraw a plea once the appeal time has 
expired and why this could not be handled as an issue in post-conviction relief when 
there is one year to file that action. 
It was suggested [hat Molly send a specific proposal to Justice Burdick to be circulated 
with a ballot along with the minutes. 
The meeting adjourned at approximately 3:30 p.m. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE AlTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE O. WASDEN 
December 19,2003 
Justice Roger S. Burdick 
ldaho Supreme Court 
P.0 Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
Dear Justice Burdlck:. 
At the November 21 meeting of the Criminal Ruies Advisory Committee, there 
was discussion of amending Rule 30 of the ldaho Criminal Ruies to require the parties 
to state their objactians to the jury instnrctions in order to presewe instruction issues for 
appeal. Such an amendment would bring the rule into conformity with the 
corresponding provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the conclusion 
of the discussion of this issue, you invited the members on each side of this issue to 
submit their views to the Court in writing. 
My previous leder to Cathy Derden, which was distributed to the members of the 
committee, sets forth the arguments for amending Rule 30. 1 would like to ask the Court 
to consider the points addressed in that letter, and to also submit some brief additional 
thoughts. 
First, as pointed out prevlously, the holding of State v. Smith, 117 ldaho 225, 
229, 786 P.2d 1127 (1990), thatthe failure to object to an instruction at trial in a criminal 
case does not constitute a waiver of any objection to the Instructions on appeal: is 
contrary to the general rule that appellate courts will not consider issues that are 
presented for the first time on appeal. What is rema$able is that neither the SJ& 
opinion nor other opinions of this court provide any actual rationale for such a deviation 
from the general rule. relies simply on the view that the 1980 amendment of Rule 
30 was intended to make it possible to raise on appeal issues relating to the instructions 
that were not raised in the trial court. This view was recently reiterated in State v. 
Mdeskev, 138 ldaho 691, 695, 69 P.3d 111 (2003). Assuming this view to be correct, 
it still leaves unanswered what possible reason there could be for the 1980 amendment 
to Rule 30. it should be recalled thet even in the absence of Rule 30, the general rule 
requiring an objection in the trial court to preserve an issue for appeal would, 
presumably, be applicable to issues involving jury instructions. If the 1980 amendment 
Criminal l a w  Oivirion 
p.0. Box 89720, Bales, Idaho 83720.W10 
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was intended to provide a different rule for jury instIUcti0n issues, the question remains: 
Why? What possible justification is there for such a deviation from the general rule? 
Second, as noted previously, courts in other jurisdictions generally require 
objections to jury instruction to preserve issues for appeal. ldaho is apparently the only 
jurisdiction in the country that allows appellate review of all claims of instructional error 
regardless of whether an objection was raised below. Some courts hold that all 
objections to jury instructlons not raised to the trial court are waived. See, e.g, Allison v. 
State, 200 So.2d 653 (Alabama 1967); Smith v. State, 565 So.2d 904, 907 (Ga.App. -
2002); State v. Gordon, 809 A.2d 748, 750 (N.H, 2002); p e o ~ l e  V. Jordal, 742 N.Y.S.2d 
760. 761 (N.Y. A.D., 4th Div. 2002); State v. Williams, 223 S.E.2d 38, 43 (S.C. 1976). 
Most courts hold that, in the absence of a trial objectlon to jury instructions, the 
appellate court will review only for clear or fundamental error, or will otherwise require 
an elevated appellate standard. E.g. United States V. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 265-67 (3d 
Cir. 2007); Unlted States v. Sabino, 274 F.3d 1053, 1070 (6th Cir. 2001); United States 
V. Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500, 509 (7th Cir. 2002): United States v. Coleman, 284 F.3d 
892, 894 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Romero, 282 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Dobberke v. State, 40 P.3d 1244,1246-47 (Alaska App. 2002); State V. Canez, 42 P.3d 
564. 587 (Az. 2002); People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754, 777 (Ca. 2002); Peooie v. 
Lawrence, 55 P.3d 155, 160-61 (Co. App., Dlv 3, 2001); State v. Smith, 742 P.2d 451, 
454-55 (Mont. 1987): Rossana v. State, 934 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Nev. 1997); State v, 
Griffin 46 P.3d 102,105 (N.M. 2002); State v, Geukqeuzian, 54 P.3d 640,642 (Ut. ~ p p .  
-? 
2002); State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 164, 204 (Wash. 2001); &own V. State, 44 P.3d 97, loo 
(Wyo. 2002). This latter rule is the one that would be consistent with Idaho's approach 
to the presewation of issues for appeal, and is the one that should be adopted. 
These two considerations- the inconsistency of the current rule with Idaho's 
general rule requiring objections in the trial court, and its inconsistency with the rule in 
other jurisdictions-are worth weighing in addressing the primary argument put forth by 
the opponents of the proposed rule change at the commitfee meeting. There, the 
opponents appeared to contend that framing objections to jury instructions at trial, in 
view of the pressures and time constraints assoclated with trial practice, was just too 
difficult a task. 
it should be noted that other trial situations place more demanding burdens on 
counsel, yet that does not remove the necessity for timely objections. For instance, 
Rule 103(a) of the ldaho Rules of Evidence requires a timely objection to rulings 
admitting or excluding evidence, and states that errors may not be predicated upon 
such rulings in the absence of such an objection. (There is an exception forplain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court: 
Rule 103(d).) An objection to testimony at trial often requires counsel to make virtually 
instantaneous decisions based upon such considerations as the legal propriety of the 
evidence offered, whether the evlden,ce'will be damaging or helpful to counsels 
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case, and whether an objection will simply call attention to evidence that may be 
harmful to counsels case. Such decisions are not easy, but, as we all kndw, trial 
practice is a demanding discipline. By contrast, trial counsel genbrally have much more 
time to weigh the propriety and usefulness of proposed jury instructions. Any lawyer 
who can offer objections to testimony should be able to do the same when it comes to 
jury instructions. 
Further, defense counsel in other states are able to cope with a rule requiring 
objections to jury instructions. Indeed, counsel here in Idaho are required to do the 
same when they appear in federal court. 
Finally, as an example of an attorney's making a tactical choice to withhold 
objections to jury instructions with intent to instead raise those issues on appeal, 
attached is a page from a transcript in a case currently pending on appeal, State v. 
Tibbs Docket No. 27837. On page 455, lines 3-20, the court asks if there are -. 
objections to the jury instructions and counsel replies by declining to comment "given the 
current state of appellate procedure." I do not mean to suggest that there was anything 
improper or unethical about counsers conduct in that case. But it is worth noting that 
trial courts should be afforded the benefit of counsels thoughts on the jury instructions, 
and should not have to resort to cross-examination of counsel in order to determine 
their views and objections. 
The proposed 'amendment to Rule 30 would bring our practice into line with 
Idaho's historic precedents, our general rules pertaining to preservation of issues for 
appeal, the law in other jurisdictions, and common sense. We ask the Court to consider 
the proposed amendment to the rule. 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
1 JAN 2 9 2007 
DAVID L. YOUNG CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTTNG ATTORNEY E BULLARD. DEPUTY 
canyon County Courthouse 
1 1 1 5 Albany 
Caldweil, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 1 
) CASE NO. CV0700728 
DefendanttPetitioner, j 
) ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
vs. ) POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
COMES NOW, The State of Idaho, by and through its attorney, the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and answer the allegations of Petitioner's Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief as follows: 
I. 
The Respondent admits Paragraph(s) 1,2,3,4,  5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,  10, 11, 13, 18, 19,20 
and 23 of the Petition. 
11. 
Respondent denies Paragraph(s) 12, "11. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner 
Was Denied the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial" in its entirety including paragraphs 14, 
15, 16, 17, (counsel is without adequate information to either admit or deny on the basis that 
ANSWER 1 
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay ans.wpd 
these allegations lack the specificity required under I.C.R.. 57 and I.C. $19-4901 and 19-4903) 
and "111. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel on Appeal" in its entirety including paragraphs 21, and 22 (counsel is without adequate 
information to either admit or deny on the basis that these allegations lack the specificity required 
under I.C.R.. 57 and I.C. $19-4901 and 19-4903) of the Petition. 
111. 
Responding to the specific allegations of the Petitioner's Petition, the Respondent 
denies each and every allegation not expressly admitted, denied or otherwise responded to herein. 
IV. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Petitioner's claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and 
the Petition should be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4906. 
v. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Idaho Code, Section 19-4901(b) requires post conviction relief under Idaho law 
as prayed for by the Petitioner be an exclusive remedy in place of all other remedies challenging 
conviction or sentence. The Defendant has appealed his conviction to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in Case No. 3 1652 who has affirmed his conviction and sentence. Therefore, the 
Petitioner has improperly presented a Petition before this Court for post conviction relief and 
Petitioner's Petition must be dismissed. 
VI. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Defendant has failed to provide the appropriate affidavits, records and other 
evidence supporting his Petition pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4903, thereby making 
Petitioner's Petition insufficient to sustain the requirement for a proper application for post 
ANSWER 2 
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conviction relief and must, therefore, be dismissed. 
VII. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The pleadings and record in the above entitled case and in criminal case 
CR0321789 in Canyon County District Court are sufficient to allow the court to make a decision 
upon the Petitioner's Petition and said record and pleadings are sufficient to find that no purpose 
would be served by a post conviction relief proceeding and, therefore, the Petitioner's petition 
should be dismissed. 
VIII. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The record and pleadings in the above entitled case and in criminal case 
CR0321789 are the entire record in the matter and that record supports the finding that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and that a summary judgment and/or dismissal in favor of 
the Respondent is warranted pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4906(c). 
WHEREFORE, The Respondent prays this court to consider the Petitioner's 
Petition, the Respondent's Answer and the pleadings and record in the above entitled case and in 
criminal case CR0321789 and act as follows: 
1 .  Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the above entitled action 
without further hearing and pursuant to Idaho Code provisions 2 9-4901 et seq.; 
2. Grant the Respondent such other relief, legal and equitable, as the court 
may deem proper. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 




DAVID L. YOUNG 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
CANYCN COUNTY CLERK 
E BULLARD, DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, ) 
) CASE NO. CV0700728 
Defendantipetitioner, 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
VS. j UPCRA PETITION 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Respondent 
State of Idaho, who pursuant to I.C.R.P. 12(e), I.C.R.P. 12 (f), I.C.R. 57, Idaho Code $19-4902, 
and Idaho Code 9 19-4903 moves the Court to strike the "Verified Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief' filed herein for the reasons that: 
1. The pleading does not comply with I.C.R. 57(a) as to form and content. 
2. The pleading does not contain sufficient factual allegations as what conduct is 
alleged to qualify as a cause of action or ground of relief under I.C. $19-4901. 
Petitioners "headings" are not factual allegations, but are conclusory legal 
statements. &, King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 (Ct.App. 1988); 
MOTION TO STRIKE UPCRA PETITION 1 
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay strikcmot.wpd 
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,715 P.2d 369 (Ct.App. 1986), and Smith v. 
State, 94 Idaho 469,491 P.2d 733 (1971). -
3. The pleading does not sufficiently identify in a non-conclusory manner what any 
potentially cognizable claims for relief are. 
Oral argument is requested. 
~ ~ G a n u a r y ,  2007. DATED thi - 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Strike UPCRA Petition was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83702, 
f i b a n u a t y ,  2007. counsel for Petitioner, on or about thi - 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION TO STRIKE UPCRA PETITION 2 
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DAVID L. YOUNG 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
11 15 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
E BULLARD, DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 1 
) CASE NO. CV0700728 
DefendantIPetitioner, 1 
) EX PARTE MOTION FOR 
vs. ) SUMMARY DISMISSAL UNDER 
j I.C. §19-4906(b) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ? 
COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Respondent 
State of Idaho, who moves the Court for an Order of Summary Dismissal under LC.§ 19-4906(b) 
on the basis that the Verified Petition filed herein is insufficient to entitle Petitioner to post 
conviction relief under I.C. $19-4901 et.seq., and that no purpose would be served by further 
proceedings. 
No argument is requested as the Court can review the entire record herein, the record 
under State v. Shane McKay, CR0321789C and Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 31652 to make 
this determination and issue an appropriate written order and decision. 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL UNDER I.C.§19-4906(b) 1 
H:\MOTlON.ORD\mckayexparie molsumdis.wpd 
as+ DATED this -day of January, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ex Parte 
Motion for Summary Dismissal under I.C. 4 19-4906(b) was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. 
& @ k f  January, Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about this - 
2007. 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL UNDER I.C.9 19-4906(b) 2 
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DAVID L. YOUNG 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
canyon County Courthouse 
1 1 15 Albany 
CaldweI1, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) CASE NO. CV0700728 
j 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
j PERMISSION TO CONDUCT 
) DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, Respondent State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney of record, the 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, who pursuant to I.C.R. 57(b), Aeschliman v. 
State, 132 Idaho 397, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct.App. 1999) and Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602,21 -
P.3d 924 (2001) objects to Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery. The basis 
for the objection as follows: 
1. Discovery in Post Conviction Relief cases is limited under the above authorities 
and is allowed only with court authorization. Unless discovery is necessary to 
protect an applicant's substantive rights, the District Court is not required to order 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PERMSSION 
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 1 
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay obj. wpd 
discovery. 
2. The denial of discovery does not involve a fundamental constitutional right. In 
order to be granted discovery, a post conviction applicant must identify the type of 
information that he may obtain through discovery that could affect the disposition 
of his application for post conviction relief. 
3. In his motion, Petitioner seeks lo take the depositions of Attorneys Richard Harris 
and Justin Curtis 3 Jason Pintler, and specifically wants to discover 
"2. Had Attorney Harris reviewed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision 
in State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 108 P.2d 410 (Ct.App. 2005)?' 
4. Petitioner's counsel has requested "judicial notice of the files and records in 
v. Shane McKay, No. CR0321789 and the file, record, transcripts and exhibits in 
State v. Shane McKay, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 3 1652." Those files 
contain the various motions, jury instructions of the Court, proposed jury 
instructions of the Defendant, the arguments of counsel, and voluminous other 
materials relevant to this action, all of which are readily available for review by 
the Petitioner. 
5. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference are the following 
exhibits: 
A. I.C.J.I. 709 VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER 
B. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, filed October 29,2004. 
C. DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, lodged October 
22,2004. 
D. Reporter's Transcript CONFERENCE ON INSTRUCTIONS, October 29, 
2004. 
E. Reporter's Transcript CLOSING ARGUMENTS, October 20,2004. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION 
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 2 
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F. State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 108 P.3d 410 (Ct.App. 2005). 
6. The reason asserted for the proposed discovery is frivolous, unwarranted, and 
shows a lack of reasonable inquiry under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(l). As stated above, jury 
instructions were proposed by Attorney Harris on October 22,2004. The jury 
instruction conference was held on October 29,2004. The Court's jury 
instructions were given to the jury on October 29,2004. was released and 
filed on January 10,2005, SEVENTY THREE DAYS AFTER THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN. The asserted basis for post conviction relief 
and the need for discovery is premised upon the theory that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to review an opinion at a time when the opinion did not 
exist. It is premised upon a case decided under Idaho Code Section 18-4006(3)(6) 
when Petitioner was charged and convicted under Idaho Code Section 18- 
4006(3)(b). Petitioner was convicted under the Felony Vehicular Manslaughter 
statute, not the provisions of the misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter statute at 
issue in McNair. 
Respondent requests the Court enter an order denying the Petitioner's Motion for 
Discovery. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED thi &*f January, 200'7 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney IV 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION 
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 3 
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay objwpd 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to 
Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, 
8 G o f  January, 200'7. Boise, Idaho 83702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about thi - 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION 
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 4 
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay obj.wpd 
+. 
i ICJI 709 VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular 
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant [name], while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of [description of misdemeanor or 
infraction] [driving while under the influence of alcohol] ; 
[andl 
[4. the unlawful act was committed with gross negligence; 
and] 
[4] [5]. the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in 
such unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to 
the death of [name of decedent (s) I . 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of [insert 
description of misdemeanor or infraction] [driving while under 
the influence of alcohol] is committed when all of the following 
are found to exist: 
[Insert elements from statute or other instructions] 
If the state has failed to prove any of the above, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. If you unanimously find that the 
state has proven each of the above, including each component of 
the unlawful act of [insert description of misdemeanor or 
infraction] [driving while under the influence of alcohol] 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
Comment 
I.C. § 18-4006. 
The committee chose to use the term "unlawful act," rather than 
mcrime,l' in paragraph number 3. An infraction could constitute 
the offense that gives rise to the vehicular manslaughter 
charge. Inf ractions are criminal offenses. State v. Bennion, 112 
Idaho 32, 730 P. 2d 952 (1986) . 
This first alternative paragraph number 4 should be used only 
when the defendant is charged under IC § 18-4006(3) (a). See ICJI 
342 for definition of Itgross negligence." 
[Revised July 20051 
CNYOh!  COLIN"/ CLERK 
S. biLi;:;a, CCPIJTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
) CASE NO. CR-03-21789-C 
-vs- 1 
1 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
SHANE MCKAY 1 
1 
Defendants. ) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 101 
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you 
what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be 
doing. At the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to 
reach your decision. 
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. After the state's opening 
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has 
presented its case. 
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge against the 
defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the 
defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is 
evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence. 
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the 
law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given time 
for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to help 
you understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not evidence, 
neither are the closing arguments. After the closing arguments, you will leave the 
courtroom together to make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have with 
you my instructions, the exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in 
court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 102 
This criminal case has been brought by the state of Idaho. I will sometimes refer to 
the state as the prosecution. The state is represented at this trial by a deputy prosecuting 
attorney, Virginia Bond and Gearld L. WoUI: The defendant, Shane Mckay, is 
represented by Richard L. Harris. The defendant is charged by the state of Idaho with a 
violation of law. The charge against the defendant is contained in an Information. The 
clerk shall read the Information and state the defendant's plea 
The Information is simply a description of the charge; it is not evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 103 
Under our law and system ofjustice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The 
presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that 
burden throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his or her innocence, 
nor does the defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason 
and common sense. It is the kind of doubt which would make an ordinary person hesitant to 
act in the most important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence 
you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must fmd the defendant not 
guilty. 
INSTRUC77ON NO. 104 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions 
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state 
the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding 
others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before 
you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful 
performance by you of these duties is vital to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. 
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by 
rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a 
witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked 
to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed 
to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I 
sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer the question 
or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have 
been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a 
particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your mind, and not refer to it or rely 
on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which 
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will 
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any 
problems. Your are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from 
time to time and help the trial run more smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct 
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to 
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole 
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you 
attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with 
you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday 
affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you shouid apply 
in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more 
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the 
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness 
had to say. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on 
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consi&er the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
LNSTRUCTION NO. 105 
If during the trial I may say or do anything, which suggests to you that I am inclined 
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by 
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will 1 intend to intimate, 
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of 
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard 
it. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 106 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject 
must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty 
to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 107 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you 
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury 
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear 
other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night,.please leave your notes in the jury 
room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and 
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. Ln addition, you cannot assign to one 
person the duty of taking notes for all of you. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 108 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following 
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during 
the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
First, do not taIk about this case either among yourselves or with anyone eise during 
the course of the trial. You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or 
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision after you have 
heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instruction and after the final 
arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is 
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room. 
Second, do no let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does 
tak about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they won't stop talking, report that to 
the bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors 
about what has happened. 
Third. during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any 
witnesses. By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to 
pass the time of day. In no other way can all parties be assured of the fairness they are 
entitled to expect from you as jurors. 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside 
of the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony without an 
explicit order from me to do so. You must not consult any books, dictionaries, 
encyclopedias or any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do 
so. 
Fifth. do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or 
television broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is presented 
in court and not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what may have 
happened. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to 
the law. 
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some 
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the 
rules, you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a d e  or law different from any I 
tell you, it is my instruction that you must follow. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 1 A 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, as charged in the 
information, the state must prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about the 51h day of October, 2003, 
2. in the state of Idaho, Canyon County, 
3. the defendant, Shane McKay, drove or was in actualphysical control of 
4. a motor vehicle 
5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the 
public, 
6. while under the influence of alcohol 
while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of 
defendant's blood, 
7. and the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. you must find the defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201 B 
The phrase "actual physical control." means being in the driver's position of the 
motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201C 
The term "highway" means the same as "street" and includes public roads, alleys, 
bridges and adjacent sidewalks and rights-of-way. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201D 
To prove that someone was under the influence of alcohol, it is not necessary that 
any particular degree or state of intoxication be shown. The state need ody show that the 
defendant had consumed sufficient alcohol to affect the defendant's ability to drive the 
motor vehicle. 
NSTRUCTION NO. 201 E 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If 
you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that 
precise date. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 1 F 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act 
and intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 1 G 
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be 
considered for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted. 
mSTRUCTION NO. 201H 
You have heard the testimony of Tina Hoover concerning a statement made by 
Mike Warren before this trial. The believability of a wimess may be challenged by 
evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a statement that was not 
consistent with the wimess' testimony in this case. Evidence of this kind may be 
considered by you only for the purpose of deciding whether you believe Mark Warren's 
testimony. This evidence of an earlier statement has been admitted to help you decide if 
you believe Mike Warren's testimony. You cannot use these earlier statements as 
evidence in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2011 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to 
testify. The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and 
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt From the fact 
that the defendant did not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your 
deliberations in any way. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 206 
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those 
facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence 
presented in the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What 
they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is 
included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts 
as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, 
follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been 
instructed to disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
~NST~UCTION NO. 207 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of 
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will 
retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
The arguments and statements of the attomeys are not evidence. If you remember 
the facts differently from the way the attomeys have stated them, you should base your 
decision on what you remember. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are 
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of 
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the 
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your 
position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, 
but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertaimnent and 
declaration of the truth. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before 
making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of 
the evidence you have seen and heard in this coutroom about this case, together with the 
law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions. 
During your deliberations. you each have a right to re-examine your own views and 
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest 
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw 
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourselt but you should do so only after a 
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or 
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the 
jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 208 
You have been instructed as to dl the rules of law that may be necessary for you to 
reach a verdict. Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your 
determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of 
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an 
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
NSTRUCTION NO. 209 
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They 
are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on 
them in any way. 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in refwring to specific 
instructions. There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there 
is, you should not concern yourselves about such gap. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 1 
Upon retiring to the jury room. select one of you as a presiding juror, who wit1 
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that 
the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has 
a chance to express himself or herself upon each question. 
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the 
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court. 
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise. 
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully 
discussed the evidcnce before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate 
with me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how 
the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unIess you are instructed by me to do so. 
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you 
with these instructions. 
DATED This a Tiay of kC. 2003 
-7 
RICHARD L. HARRIS 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1438 
1023 Arthur 
Caldwefl, Idaho 83606 
Phone: (208) 459-1588 
Fax: (208) 459-1300 
ISB No. 1387 
Attorney for Defendant 
CANYON Cf7Uh:W CLCf?K 
$. !!?.,!.I:.:?, .7 -:.?!JP( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 




1 DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
SHANE MCKAY, 





COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant by and through his attorney and submits 
their proposed Jury Instructions and Respectfully request this Court to consider said 
instructions in instructing the jury in this action. 
DATED: This $ day of October, 2004. n 
Exhibit --J2L-- 
008083 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I the undersigned do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was served on the following this a day of October, 2004. 
DAVID L. YOUNG United States Mail 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse 0 Hand Delivered 
1 1 15 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 Facsimile 
000084 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTlONS - 2 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol is committed when all of the following are found to exist: 
1. That on or about October 5, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle; 
4. Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property 
open to the public; 
5. While under the influence of alcohol andlor who has an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine 
or breath. 
If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must Find the Defendant not guilty. 
000085 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
ICJI 709 
Instruction No. 
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or 




In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and 




A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption 
places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Thus, a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against 
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant 
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore, if after considering all of the 
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not guilty. 
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to 
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of 
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they wuiot say 
they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
ICJI 103 
Instruction No. 
You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his 
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to the 
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt. 
State v. Holder, 1100 Idaho 129,594 P.2d 639 (1979) 
State v, Hwnphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000) 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"It shall be unlawfui for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any 
vehicle which does not contain those parts w is not at all time equipped with the 
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is 
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho 
Code. " 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motorcycle and every motor-driven cycle shall carry at least one 
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a 
height of not less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and 
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from 
all distances within three hundred fifty (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the 
vehicle when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps." [LC. 49- 
9071 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Nothin herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle t h w m  or older 
of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1) inch 
in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the 
requirements of I.C. 49-906." 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motor vehicle ... shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp 
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light 
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall 
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than 
twenty (20) inches. [LC. 49-9061 
A violation of 'the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
The term "negligence" refers to a lack of that attention to the probable 
consequences of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to 
the person's own affairs. 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol is committed when all of the following are found to exist: 
1. That on or about October 5, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle; 
4. Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property 
open to the public; 
5. While under the influence of alcohol andlor who has an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine 
or breath. 
If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
00089G 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
Instruction No. 
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or 
reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety and rights of 
others. 
Instruction No. 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and 
intent or criminal negligence. 
Instruction No. 
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption 
places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Thus, a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against 
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant 
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore, if after considering all of the 
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt. you must return a verdict of not guilty. 
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to 
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of 
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say 
they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
Instruction No. 
You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his 
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to. the 
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt. 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any 
vehicle which does not contain those parts or is not at all time equipped with the 
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is 
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho 
Code. " 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motorcycle and every motordriven cycle shall carry at least one 
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a 
height of not less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and 
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from 
all distances within three hundred fifty (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the 
vehicle when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps." [I.C. 49- 
9071 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years or 
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1) 
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the 
requirements of I.C. 49-906." 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motor vehicle ... shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp 
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light 
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall 
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than 
twenty (20) inches. [LC. 49-9061 
A violationof the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
The term "negligence* refers to a lack of that attention to the probable 
consequences of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to 
the person's own affaim. 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit -the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years or 
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1) 
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the 
requirements of I.C. 49-906. " 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
I. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted 
limit but without gross negligence; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
ICJI 709 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003: 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted 
limit but without gross negligence; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
STATE OF IDAHO v. 
STATE OF IDAHO. L 
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1 MR. HARRIS: Judge, if it please the 
2 Court. I have submitted to the Court this mornins after 
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the eiidence has been presented an instruction 6n 
vehicular manslaughter that is an instruction that 
would activate subpart (c) of the vehicular 
manslaughter statute. 
And I offer the instructions on this 
basis. The State has charsed under cart (b), which is 
a felony. There is eviden6 under the record that 
Shane McKay may weil have operated this vehicle with a 
BA less than -08. Because of the differential in the 
time that the BA was taken and the time of the 
accident, the jury could weil find that that didn't ~. 
apply. 
The jury could find, because of the 
speed issues that were presented in evidence of this 
case, that the unlawful act which triggers the 
culpability could be the infraction of a speed greater 
than the speed limit, which would then bring into 
operation the misdemeanor section of the statute, so 
the evidence would support the misdemeanor instruction. 
And it seems to me that the manner in which this case 
has been charaed would also aive the Court authoritv 
24 for the giving 6f this instruct&. 
I125 We have talked briefly about cause, and 
1 CALDWEU, IDAHO, OCTOBER 29,2004 
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10 THE COURT: All right. We're taking up 
11 State vs. McKay outside the jury presence, I have been 
12 meeting with the attorneys regarding proposed final 
13 instructions, and I had caused to be delivered 201, a 
14 verdict form, through instruction 211. I was also 
15 provided with a proposed instruction drafted by the 
16 defendant with regard to a lesser included of 
17 misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. 
18 I'll take up at this time first with the 
19 State. Mr. Wolff, do you have objections or concerns 
20 regarding the instructions or the verdict form? 
21 MR. WOLFF: Judge, on the packet of 
22 instructions that you have provided to us, no, I do not 
23 have any objections. 
24 THE COURT: Ail right. Thank you. 
25 Mr. Harris. 
13 
CANYON COUNN CASE NO. CR2003-21789 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 31652 Q0443318 
Exhibit- 
D 
1 the dilemma is what to do about cause. And I have 
2 essentially taken the position that cause is something 
3 that I'm not requesting a jury on this morning, but 
4 it's certainly part of the dilemma. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
6 Mr, Woiff, 
7 MR. WOLFF: Your Honor, under 
8 Mr. Harris's theory and under the statute as alleged, 
9 there is either, A, no lesser included under the 
10 vehicular manslaughter as we have charged under 
11 subsection (b), or there are two lesser includeds, both 
12 (a) and (c), felony vehicular manslaughter with gross 
13 negligence under the interpretation of the facts that 
14 Mr. Harris wants to give. I wanted to make a record of 
15 that. 
16 He's talking about the speed and only 
17 the speed. He's not talking about the crossing over of 
18 the double yellow line at the railroad track to 
19 oncoming traffic and running into the back of the 
20 motorcycle proceeding down the roadway in his lane of 
21 travel. That's gross negligence. It's reckless to 
22 cross the double yellow or to cross over a centerline 
23 at a railroad track. That's the statute. That's the 
24 reckless driving statute. 




STAVE OF IDAHO v. S&E McKAY 
to obviously the statute, vehicular manslaughter. 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice, and vehicular can be committed in three 
different ways, (a), the commission of an unlawful act 
APPEAL AUGMENT 
. . . .. 
not amounting to a felony with gross negligence, and 
(c), the commission of an unlawful act not amountinq to 
1 support the lesser included of felony vehicular 
2 manslaughter as much as there is to support a 
3 misdemeanor manslaughter without gross negligence. 
4 That's not how we have it charged, We ' 
5 have this charged as subsection (b), under the 
6 influence and/or, in the alternative, with a BAC over 
7 .08. There's sufficient evidence in the record. 
8 Mr. Harris wants to attack the BAC, but if you remember 
9 Officer Woolery -- excuse me -- Officer Marek's 
10 testimony at the point when she made contact with Shane 
11 McKay at the scene within 10,15 minutes of the 
12 accident, her opinion was that he was under the 
13 influence of alcohol, so that fact is right there at 
14 the scene. 
15 Judge, we have charged under subsection 
16 (b). We don't believe there is a lesser included of 
17 misdemeanor manslaughter on the charge or the facts 
18 that you have presented to you. Mr, Harris wants to 
19 nitpick each and every fact here, and using his theory 
20 and logic, every criminal case would have some type of 
21 lesser included, and that's not the law. Lesser 
22 includeds are those offenses that come from the main 
23 charge that are factually supported by the charge and 
24 for which there's legally sufficient basis for a 
25 finding of guilt. 
16 
a felony without gross negligence. 
- 
The State did not elect to charge under 
(a) or (c). They chose instead to charge under (b), 
the commission of a violation of Section 18-8004 or 
8006. I n  this case, they elected the driving under the 
influence under 8004. 
I also looked specifically how Idaho 
defined gross negligence. Essentially, gross 
negligence is such negligence as amounts to wanton, 
flagrant, or reckless disregard of the safety of 
others. 
And Mr. Harris has offered this 
instruction. I believe that I am precluded from giving 
it because this proposed misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter instruction can only be a lesser included 
under (a) of the statute. I n  other words, it can only 
be a lesser included because it would be less than 
gross negligence. (A) is with gross negligence. (C) 



























1 He can't have it both ways, I f  he has a 
2 lesser included, it's felony vehicular manslaughter 
3 before they even reach the misdemeanor vehicular 
4 manslaughter. We don't believe that it's appropriate 
5 for a lesser included. 
6 THE COURT: All right, Thank you. 
7 The Court has given a lot of thought to 
8 whether the iving of a lesser included offense could 
9 be given or t f i .  e jury could be instructed to consider. 
10 And in doing so, I went back and looked at the two 
11 analyses for the consideration of lesser included. 
12 A lesser included offense is one which 
13 is necessarily committed in the commission of another 
14 offense or, one, the essential elements of which are 
15 charged in the Information as the manner or means by 
16 which the offense is committed, and that's State versus 
17 McCormick, 100 Idaho 111,1979, and ICR 31(c). 
18 Having considered both ways to look at 
19 this, I always have to go back to the Information in 
20 this case, which specifically charges that Shane McKay 
21 did unlawfully, without malice, kill Ted Cox by 
22 operating a motor vehicle in the commission of a 
23 violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004 under the 
24 influence of alcohol in this case. 
25 So in analyzing this, I further go back 
< 7  
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I agree that in their cross-examination 
of the State's experts that they may have raised --the 
defense may have raised the issue and it was admitted 
that Shane McKay's BAC could have been less than -08 a 
the time that it happened, so that's going to have to 
be an argument that's made to the jury. 
And as I see it, we're left with the one 
instruction and the one verdict form, so I'm going -- 
the instruction will be ~resewed for appeal that was 
proposed, and I'm ready to instruct the jury as I 
proposed in the instructions, 
Mr, Harris, did you have any other 
concerns you wanted to raise about the verdict or the 
instructions? 
MR. HARRIS: Judge, just one other 
comment. I understand the Court's ruling and will 
accept that ruling for purposes of this morning. But I 
probably -- and I just need to clarify my record on 
this, and that is that, as I understand that statute, 
it talks in terms of an unlawful act that caused the 
death. 
The first one is an unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony with gross negligence. The 
second one is an unlawful a 4  meaning the DUI or being 
under the influence, The third one is an unlawful act 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 31652 
Q O Q a l l l  
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1 not amounting to a misdemeanor --yeah, a misdemeano~ 
2 not a felony, but without gross negligence. And so as 
3 I read these three statutes together, it becomes an 
4 included offense because we're talking about an 
5 unlawful a d  in each event. 
6 They've elected to charge under one 
7 felony statute, and the unlawful act could be the 
8 misdemeanor. They could find without gross negligence, 
9 which would bring into play number three. 
10 But I understand the Court's ruling and 
11 we will proceed from there, Judge. 
12 THE COURT: All right. At this time, 
13 then, we'll go ahead and have the jurors brought down 
14 and we'll proceed with final instructions. We are in 
15 recess. 
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1 CALDWELL, IDAHO, OCTOBER 29,2004 
2 
3 
accountability is the factor. 
I n  this particular case, the person who 
made those choices is Shane McKay. He made the choice, 
number one, to consume alcohol. He made the choice, 
number two, to drive an automobile. And he made the 
choice, number three, to drive that automobile in a 
reckless and careless manner taking the life of Ted 
cox. 
This is no accident. This is a wreck. 
Shis is a collision, This is a crash. This is what 
we're here about today and what we've all spent the 
last four days covering as evidence. 
The State does have the burden of proof 
as always, and the State has to prove certain things. 
And to prove certain things, we have presented facts 
through testimony here. You must weigh and determine 
which of those apply and basically decide what happened 
in this case. 
Let's go over those elements first. 
This is kind of what I call the building blocks of our 
case. First of all, the State must prove that this 
crime occurred on or about October Sth, 2003. Several 
people have talked about that, police officers, Mike, 
Monique. 
That this crime occurred in Canyon -- 
7 
4 (Counsel for respective 
5 parties present, along with 




10 MS. BOND: Good morning, ladies and 
11 gentlemen. First of all, let me start off by telling 
12 you how much we greatly appreciate your time, your 
13 attention, and your presence here, Without that, we 
14 couldn't work this great system of justice that we all 
15 are within, and we're proud of it. So on behalf of 
16 myself and Mr. Wolff and the prosecutor's office, we 
17 thank you. 
18 Let me draw your attention to one thing 
19 as I start opening argument here. Notice, if you will, 
20 that I have never used the term "accident" during this 
21 presentation of the case, and there's a reason for 
22 that, because this case was not an accident. This case 
23 is a situation of willful conduct, This is choices 
24 that were made by an individual, and these choices 
25 resulted in the death of someone's loved one, and 
22 
County, state of Idaho, Police officers again. I t  
happened behind the Lowe's. Yes, that's in Canyon 
County, state of Idaho. 
Number three, that Shane McKay drove or 
was in actual physical control. He admitted it, 
admitted it to Tonna Woolety. 
Motor vehicle, the Cadillac that is 
sitting over at the shop that you saw, 
And this happened upon a highway, 
street, bridge, or property open to the public. 
Several officers testified about, that that's a road 
they travel every day. Ed Robertson, for one, told you 
about that road and the contour of i t  specifically, 
And under the influence of alcohol, 
four, over .08. 
These are the building blocks of this 
particular case, and I've gone over some of the facts 
that you've heard in court through the testimony that 
support that. So once you realize, of course, that 
this is not an accident, the way that we start with 
looking at it is the first person that we heard 
testify, Steve Wood. 
Steve didn't know these folks that were 
coming in front of him. He looked up. He was driving 
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1 lights. He thought first it was a car. No, it's too 
2 wide. Those are motorcycles. So he had his window 
3 open. He looked out and admired the motorcycles going 
4 by him, and he looked up and saw a car halfway in his 
5 lane. 
6 He was crossing the railroad tracks the 
7 bikes had just crossed. He saw this car coming at a 
8 high rate of speed and swerved back into the other lane 
9 heading toward K-mart, and he thought he doesn't have 
10 room, there's not enough room. Just as he thought 
11 that, he heard the crash, saw the dirt fly. The 
12 tremendous noise that accompanied this crash woke his 
13 little giri up. 
14 He pulled over to the side of the road 
15 and called the police as Monique ran toward him 
16 frantic, He didn't go back to the scene, but his 
17 impression of this was very clear in that he saw the 
18 motor vehicle coming, it was on the wrong side of the 
19 road going back Into the other lane, and heard the 
20 crash. 
21 And remember, I asked him if he had any 
22 background in ejtimating speed, and his estimate was 60 
23 miles per hour, So when you look at the facts that 
24 Steve purported, they line up with what also Mike and 
25 Monique testified to. 
l r  
1 LJ 
1 Mike and Monique were there. They were 
2 on the motorbike next to Mr, Cox situated closest to 
3 the centerline of the road. Mike was also driiing a 
4 Harley-Davidson and Monique was on the back, and her 
5 job was to check all the taillights and all the 
6 equipment on the bikes. They had gone to Denny's to 
7 get the ranch dressing, had gone by the sugar beet 
8 factory, had come over the overpass to the highway and 
9 was headed towards Shari's to eat 
10 They reported, both of them, that this 
11 is a hard tail motorcycle. It's got no shocks, so you 
12 have to go slow over bumpy areas like railroad tracks, 
13 so they slowed down. As they slowed down, they went 
14 over the railroad tracks and they both looked over at 
15 Ted, and he was laughing, he was smiling, making some 
16 gesture. Suddenly, he was gone. He was gone forever. 
17 They felt this great rush of wind, and Ted was gone. 
18 There was parts of metal. There was 
19 dirt flying in their faces, They never saw it coming. 
20 They never saw it coming, which might be a clue to 
21 interpreting what Ed Robertson testified about. 
22 They pulled the bike over. It came to a 
23 stop. Mike ran over and found his brother, who he 
24 refers to as his brother, dead, obviously dead. He 
25 covered him with his leathers - and - looked over and saw 
the car and somebody running around outside the car, 
He was tremendously angly, Someone had just killed his 
friend, his brother. He went over and he grabbed this 
person and he hit him and he put him down on the ground 
by his friend and stayed there holding him until the 
police arrived, 
And when they arrived, the first one 
that came there was Tonna Woolery. She was a 
relatively new officer that came upon the scene. She 
was the first one there. She went over to where Shane 
McKay was, and in her conversation with him, she 
noticed a few factors. 
This is State's 25. She smelled the 
odor of an alcoholic beverage. She saw bloodshot eyes. 
She saw some behavior that concerned, and his speech 
was slurred, the things he was saying, so she made a 
decision that he was perhaps under the influence of 
alcohol and asked him if he'd been drinking, He 
admitted it, He'd been drinking. So when she looked 
at the scene and saw that there wasa deceased there, 
the decision was to take him to the hospital where 
Stephanie Brannan drew blood and Tonna Woolery took 
custody of it and that blood went to the lab. 
Dave Laycock analyzed it, and Dave 
Laycock testified that the blood alcohol content was a 
77 
L I  
.15, which is almost twice the legal limit Impairment 
at that particular level would match up with the 
driving behavior in this case, according to Ed 
Robertson. 
.15 was within an hour and a half of the 
wreck, Dave Laycock testified that it would take 
approximately seven drinks to get to that point, plus 
some additional ones to keep that level going. So you 
can figure out if he hit Mr. Cox at this particular 
time and the blood came at this particular time, when 
would he have consumed those seven drinks. And the law 
in this case is perfectly clear. If you're over a ,08, 
you are driving under the influence, and if you drive 
under the influence and kill someone, then you shouM 
be held accountable. 
After Dave Laycock testified, you 
further heard the testimony of Tony Evans. Now, Tony 
Evans came upon the scene after Tonna Woolery. He also 
had conversation with Mr. McKav and told vou that he 
smelled alcohol and saw his bloodshot eyei. Both 
officers saw the same impairment indications. 
Tony made these measurements back here, 
measured from the railroad track, took those ~ictures. 
24 and found what he thought was the point of impact. ' I State's 18 is that gouge -- mark in the i 
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I 7 motorcycle went sliding down the pavement and ended up 8 riaht whereTony says it ended up, and it should have 
1 pavement. This is the issue that Ed Robertson covered 
2 with you, this gouge mark and the tire prints that are 
3 aiong each side of it. His interpretation was that 
4 that gouge mark came from the car hitting the 
5 motorcycle and the motorcycle's back tire stopping and 







vehicle wreck that we've described here, and they 
killed Ted Cox. 
Fred Rice did not do speed based on one 
factor. Fred Rice did not do speed based on one 
factor. Fred Rice did speed based on three, the 
Cadillac, the body, and the motorcycle, and he came up 
with approximately the same figures. Conservatively, 
65 miles per hour is the speed he figured, and he had 
the numbers. He even variated the numbers up there on 
the witness stand. These were cold, hard, scientific 
numbers. These aren't guesses and these aren't 
daydreams. These are based upon the measurements of 
Tony Evans out there at the scene. 
And not only did he do it three ways, he 
ended up doing it the fourth way right in front of this 
Court with the splatter information. Remember when he 
dropped his pen and that was like a time-distance 
thing? He put it into the range that I could 
understand of the motor vehicle and how the motor 
vehicle could impact the motorcycle pushing it forward, 
State's 9, this impact right here to the 
rear of the motorcycle is what we're talking about. It 
was a very hard impact. It wasn't a little bump. This 
was a smack, a high degree of velocity which sent the 
Cadillac, the motorcycle, and everything down the road. 
71 
. . 
9 eiided up there.' ' 
10 Ted's body ended up at this point at a 
11 lesser distance than the motorcycle. And it makes 
12 sense, of course, with the direction the Cadillac 
13 traveled which ended up right there high-centered on 
14 that particular curbing. 
15 As Tony was there at the scene, he was 
16 taking measurements from Midland Boulevard, which is 
17 somewhere out here. He took photographs. He saw what 
18 he termed as vapor trails, And there's been a lot of 
19 discussion about those vapor trails. We had a lot of 
20 education yesterday. I was really confused with the 
21 math, I hope everybody else was too. 
22 But those vapor trails and those pieces 
23 and fragments laying on the roadway are only leading up 
24 to the point where Ted's body is and that motorcycle 
25 is, and then there's a big gouge mark right there. 
70 
I n  this particular case, the big 
question is was this vehicle out of control, and both 
experts talked about that Let's think about what Fred 
Rice said first of all, He said he took those 
measurements, he took the photographs, he looked at 
them, he put together the information and provided a 


















cdntrol. It was out of control back here, clear back 
here before the railroad tracks. And as it's out of 
control there, it's coming across the railroad track 
leaving those scuff marks. Not tire marks. Scuff 
marks, That shows out of control. 
It veers into the lane here, and Ed 
talked about an angle, talked about an angle and, bang, 
it hits into that motorcycle and sends it flying. This 
is an action out of control. You lose control here, 
you overcorrect to go back into your lane, and that's 
what resulted in this impact, Why Mike wasn't hit and 
Monique wasn't hit, it's somebody bigger than us with 
them that day. 
Ted was, Hopefully, Ted never saw what 
was coming. The paramedics told you what his injuries 
were, He had a fractured skull. He had broken bones 
24 in his arms and legs, He had a broken neck. These 
25 particular injuries are consistent with the motor 
7n 
Fred Rice testified that those liquids 
didn't have time to s ill out until they got further 
down the road, whic 1 is consistent with velocity in 
that cup thing that he showed us. So all that 
testified to is consistent with the facts and the 
measurements that Tony Evans took and is consistent 
with the eyewitness testimony of Steve Wood, Mike, and 
Monique. 
And you also saw this motorcycle, so ou 
know how hard it was hit. This motorcycle was tl it so 
hard, State's 10, that Tony Evans had to pull that 
license plate out of the back side of that motorcycle. 
It was embedded in there. He didn't even see it at 
first. And that license plate goes to the Cadillac. 
The other thing that Tony Evans found at 
the crime scene, 22 and 23, are pictures of the license 
plate. You can study these more closely when you get 
back in the jury room. And Mr. Paulson showed you how 
the brackets on this attach to the light fixture that 
was affixed to the back of Ted's motorcycle. Three 
people testified they saw that light there that night, 
Mike, Monique, and Mr. Pauison, they saw that light. 
This license plate was affixed to it. Without the 
light, the brackets of this license plate wouldn't have 
held it in place, 
21 
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Ted was very proud of this motorcycle he 
called Mumm. He'd had her longer than Mikey's been 
alive, and that motorcycle was a big part of who he 
was. He went to that shop every Saturday. His friends 
rode, This is his fun and his enjoyment, and he took 
pride in her, and there's this taillight right there 
with his license plate on it. Why would he take that 
off? I t  wouldn't be safe. They check on that for each 
other. It wouldn't be safe. 
Because of Mr. McKay's careless driving 
and his choice to consume alcohol, Ted Cox was killed 
violently. There's brain matter along the road. There 
was brain matter around him and coming out his ears. 
He had breakage. He flew through the air quite a 
distance. His glove, his glasses, the vest, everything 
flew off of him as he was pushed by the weight of the 
Cadiilac. 
Remember, Ed Robertson testified that 
Cadillac probably weighs 4,000 pounds. There's no 
pavement that's even going to stop that Cadillac, and 
that's what hit Mr. Cox at 65 miles per hour from 
behind sending him vaulting through the air. 
What about Ted Cox's drinking that 
night? It was the last night of his life. He was 
visiting friends. He saw his mother. He was, 
33 
according to the experts, in his proper lane of traffii 
right here. He wasn't swelving. He didn't pull out in 
front of Mr. McKay. He was in his proper lane of 
traffic, He was drinking, true, but drinking doesn't 
involve the death penalty. 
Was there any contributing factors I 
asked each of the experts. The only contributing 
factor was that he was there. This was not his fault. 
And Ted had a good life. He shared i t  
with his loved ones, and they are robbed of him because 
of the choices that were made by Mr, McKay, the choices 
to consume alcohol, the choices to drive a car, and the 
choices to drive that car in a reckless and dangerous 
manner. Because of those choices, he killed Ted Cox 
and robbed him of life. And for this, he should be 
held accountable. 
This is not an accident, This is 
willful conduct. What you need to do is consider the 
facts, the testimony, the blood alcohol content, what 
the reconstructionist said, what the eyewitnesses say, 
because if you think about it in the big picture, 
you'll see what Steve Wood said about speed and 
position and what both the experts said about speed and 
position are the same, This was no accident. 
I'm going to be able - .  to address you 
again as soon as Mr, Harris is finished, but we would 
ask you to once again consider all the facts before you 
make a decision, ihank you. 
ME COURT: Thank you, Ms. Bond. 
Mr. Harris, you may proceed. 
MR. HARRIS: I f  it please the Court, 
counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I'm a Cubs 
fan, but how about those Red Sox? I wish we were here 
talking about baseball rather than what we're talking 
about this morning, 
This is an unfortunate and tragic 
accident, It's tragic to both families and to their 
friends. But, ladies and gentlemen, what this is is an 
accident. 
This is what is known as closing 
arauments. It's the time that the attorneys set an 
opportunity to visit with you as jurors. whatwe say 
to you is not evidence. I want you to be perfectly 
clear about that. I f  your recollection of the evidence 
is different than mine, you rely on yours. I'll not 
try to mislead you, but as I've indicated, if your 
recollection is different than mine, you know what you 
7C 
need to do, 
Let me talk about this instruction that 
you have received, That instruction lists those six 
items that the prosecutor has put up on that board, but 
unfortunately or intentionally, the prosecutor has 
failed to put one other additional element that is part 
of that instruction, and I'm going to take the liberty 
of putting it on there because as you get that 
instruction in the jury room, you'll notice that there 
is a number seven, and that number seven has the word 
"cause" in it. 
The way the vehicular manslaughter 
statute is written, it is written in the format that 
the driving of the vehicle and the commission of an 
unlawful act that causes death is a violation of that 
statute. 
In this particular instance, in order 
for there to be a violation of the statute, you must 
find that Shane McKay drove the vehicle -- we don't 
deny that -- on a highway. That's obvious. It's 
alleged by the prosecution that he was either under the 
influence or had a BA greater than -08 or .08 or 
greater. 
And they stopped right there because 
they take the position that if you - - do that, you are 
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1 guilty. That's not the instruction on the law that has 
2 been given you by Judge Hoff because it contains the 
3 additional word, that must cause the death of Mr. Cox. 
4 There's another instruction that needs 
5 to be talked about briefly, and that is that in every 
6 criminal offense, there must exist the joint operation 
7 of act and intent And where is the act and the intent 
8 in the evidence that you've received that caused the 
9 death of Mr, Cox? 
10 Let me just address some issues having 
11 to do with evidence in this case. And there's a number 
12 of issues that you'll have to sort out with reference 
13 to the testimony of Mr. Warren, Ms, Crownhart, and 
14 Scott Paulson. There is the issue of the position of 
15 the bikes on the roadway, There is the relationship of 
16 those bikes with each other. 
17 There is the issue of the drinking of 
18 Mr. Cox. You?l remember that they said that he'd only 
19 had one drink, that he was essentially a non-drinker, 
20 and yet, it's not possible under the law or under the 
21 facts that a person driving on the roadway with a -19 
22 BA was not a factor in what happened. 
23 But I'm verv well aware of human nature 
possible that his BA was less than .08. 
He said it would take seven -- I think 
it was seven drinks. I don't know how many of you are 
familiar with drinks. I'm not. I had learned this. 
But supposing he had a Long Island iced tea justbefore 
he leR where he was, that contained enough alcohol to 
get you there, but there's an absorption rate, there is 
an elimination rate. 
And it may have been a .I5 an hour and 
forty minutes after the accident, but as their expert 
says, it could very well have been less than -08 at the 
time of the accident. Ladies and gentlemen, that is a 
reasonable doubt. 
The prosecution wants you also to 
believe that the injuries received in the accident 
caused the death of Mr. Cox. and it seems clearlv 
17 apparent that that's the case. And because it seemed 
18 apparent to the people in charge of this, no autopsy . . . 
19 was ordered. 
20 Ladies and gentlemen, I've been either a 
21 prosecutor or defense attorney for over thirty years 
22 and I've handled lots of homicide cases. This is the 
23 first case that an autopsy hasn't been performed. 
24 and I know that friends and, in this case, brothers, And I'll tell jldu why an autdpsy is 
25 shade the truth. I think Scott Paulson and all said, 
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1 performed, It's not only to establish cause of death, 
10 
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1 you know, we will cover for each other, and that's 
2 going to be important later on in my argument. But 
3 it's your assessment of the credibility of those 
4 witnesses and the assessment of where they say things 
5 were in the entire context or the totality of the 
6 circumstances of this case. 
7 You have heard evidence, and I would 
8 submit to you that Shane was very much traumatized by 
9 what happened. They described him as crying, and the 
10 picture that was put on the screen indicates that he 
11 was crying. It's obvious that his eyes were red. He 
12 had been battered by Warren. 
13 I think he said that -- I think there 
14 was some evidence that while he was crying, he was 
15 praying. He kept repeating it was an accident, I 
16 didn't mean to hit him, he popped out of nowhere, I 
17 didn't see him, if was an accident. He kept repeating 
18 that over and over. 
19 Now, the prosecution wants you to 
20 believe that at the time of this accident, Shane was 
21 under the influence or over the legal limit. And even 
22 though there was a BA of .IS, as I recall, 
23 approximately an hour and forty minutes aRer the 
24 accident, the State's expert, the witness they called, 
25 said that at the time of the accident, it's entirely 
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1 but it's to establish that cause of death to the 
2 exclusion of every other cause and to establish 
3 evidence, 
4 MS, BOND: Your Honor, I'm going to 
5 object to him testifying about some facts that were not 
6 in evidence. 
7 ME COURT: I'll overrule the objection. 
8 I think he can make his argument. I'll continue to 
9 entertain that issue if you want to revisit it. 
10 MR. HARRIS: I don't know if any of you 
11 watch Law and Order on television. Approximately a 
12 week ago on that episode of the program, there was a 
13 situation that occurred -- I didn't see the program, 
14 but it's been related to me -- that a person, a 
15 pedestrian, was struck by a car. 
16 The injuries and cause of death seemed 
17 clearly evident by what occurred, When they performed 
18 the autopsy, they discovered a subdural hematoma that 
19 had occurred as the result of an occurrence some time 
20 prior, and it was that subdural hematoma that was the 
21 cause of death, not what appeared to be the apparent 
22 injuries of the carlpedestrian accident. Ladies and 
23 gentlemen, that's another element of reasonable doubt 
24 I don't know how many of you watch Bill 
25 O'Reilly and The O'Reilly Factor on the Fox News 
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1 channel, but he describes his program as being a 
2 no-spin zone, and he uses the word - -a  word that I 
3 learned, I never heard it before then, but he used the 
4 word "blowitate," which means, in the vernacular that 
5 I'm familiar with, don't baffle me with your BS. 
6 And let me talk about that in context 
7 with some testimony. And in this particular case, each 
8 side is represented by an attorney, Each side has had 
9 exoert witnesses come and testifv. There's been a lot 
10 of 'evidence regarding credentials' and qualification and 
11 that one side's credentials, because they belong to 
12 oroanizations. that makes them somehow more credible 
a d  more important than the other side. 
But to put that again in context, I'm 
licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho but I 
don't belong to the American Bar Association, I don't 
belong to the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association, I don't 
belong to the Idaho Criminal -- or the Idaho Lawyers 
for Criminal Justice. Does that make me any less a 
lawyer qualified to come before you and represent my 
client in this case? I am licensed to practice before 
the courts in the state of Idaho, before the federal 
courts in Idaho, before the Ninth Circuit, and before 
the United States Supreme Court, but I don't belong to 
these voluntary organizations. 
1 illuminated by the headlight. 
2 And I agree with him that it takes 204 
3 feet to stop, but what he did not include in that 
4 number is some reaction time on the part of the driver 
5 to perceive and to apply the brake, Once the brake was 
6 applied, it's 204 feet, but there is a lag time in 
7 order to get there. That's how facts are massaged and 
8  manipulated. 
9 And so I auess what I'm trvino to ooint 
10 out there is that he'; telling the truth as far &the 
11 truth goes, but the answer is not complete. And 
12 because it's not comolete, it's misleadina, The fact 
41 1l.- 
Ms. Bond, in the course of the 
examination of Mr. Freeman, worked him over about that 
affidavit. Unfortunately, I was the one that drafted 
the affidavit And we were in a hurry and he signed 
it, but that's what happened. 
Let me come back and talk about the 
1 7 experts for just a minute, and particularly Mr. Rice 
1 8 and Mr. Robertson and some contradictions in their 1 8  I 
I 4L I I  
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testimony opinions. 
First, Rice testified that the proof of 
impact where it is on that diagram over there was 
caused b the rim --the rim of the rear wheel of the Y motorcyce. Robertson said it was a cross-member on 
the Cadillac. Rice said it was a straight-on 
collision. Robertson said it was at an angle. 
And they gave a lot of testimony, but 
let me try and give you an example of the subtlety of 
the testimony and the ability to massage and manipulate 
facts to comport with their formulas and so forth. 
Talking about that no-spin zone, you 
remember Mr. Robertson talking about a requirement that 
a headlight had to illuminate the road 250 feet ahead 
and that he used I believe it was 65 miles per hour and 
that a car stops in 204 feet and, therefore, he should 
have stopped because that is .- less than the 250 feet 
that there is a reaction time there exteds, in that 
instance, the stopping distance by almost a third. So 
instead of stopping at 250 feet within the headlight, 
you stop at 290 feet. 
In addition, I noticed the tendency to 
filibuster, to manipulate information. But, ladies and 
gentlemen, you are the arbiters of their credibility 
and their testimony. 
One of the things about this case that 
has been a puzzle to me for a long time and is a 
disagreement between the State's case and their experts 
and me and my expert, and that has to do with this 




















consideration for you as jurors in this case. 
Where is the point of impact? You 
listened to the testimony of Mr. Wood, Mr. Wood 
testified that had the car crossed over his lane, went 
off the left edge of the road and tried to come back, 
there would have been a head-on collision with him. 
You listened to his testimony as he said with reference 
to the car that was coming down in the other lane of 
traffic, it crossed, he believed, the centerline, went 
back into that lane, I t  never did come completely into 
his lane of traffic. And again, on this diagram, if 
that occurred, it would have been much further down the 
road to the east than what is depicted here. He would 
have seen that. He never saw it. He never testified 
to it, 
He testified as to what happened, and 
Mr. Rice's comment about his testimony was, well, he 
didn't perceive it correctly, he didn't see what he 
saw. Whv is that imoortant with reference to this 
point of impact and why is it important with the 
testimony of the experts that reconstructed this 
accident? 
It's important because the State's 
experts did not reconstruct this accident. What they 
have done is they have taken Officer Evans' -- yeah, 
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Tony Evans' theory of this case and they have defended 
it. And Brant Freeman looked at these same facts and 
reconstructed the accident as to what happened. 
And you remember -- and I don't remember 
whether it was Mr. Rice or Mr. Robertson that testified 
that reconstruction of an accident is taking all the 
pieces of a puzzle, all of the elements that are there, 
and putting them together and figuring out what 
happened. 
Now, that wasn't really what happened 
here. What really happened is that they, as experts 
for the State, took the theory of this accident 
formulated by Mr, -- G f f~e r  Evans and defended it. 
Brant Freeman took those same facts, totality of the 
facts, and in my judgment, determined what really 
happened, and this is why. You'll remember during the 
course of the trial -- 
Could I have Exhibit A, please? 
You're going to have this when you get 
in the jury room, but during the course of the trial, I 
had the witnesses look at this numerous times. And if 
you go to page 3 -- page 1 and 2 depict the roadway of 
Karcher before you get to the railroad tracks and it's 
got what purports to be where the Cadillac left tire 
left the roadway, came back on .- the roadway. The second 
trail. We're talking about marks. From 220 feet, 
which is from this pointto this point, it's labeled 
rear wheel skld mark of motorcycle, 220 feet. 
if you listen to Mr, Robertson and 
Mr. Rice, the motorcycle --when this accident , . . . 
occurred, the motorcycle laid right down and skidded 
along the pavement all the way to where i t  came to 
rest. There are no marks for the first 83 feet. There 
should have been marks, and there were none, 
The only thing that can explain that is 
that the motorcycle was airborne for that 83.1 feet and 
finally it landed and then the marks began. That 
contradicts --and it would be impossible in the first 
place because of weight and gravity, but it contradicts 
the testimony of Mr. Rice and Mr. Robertson because 
there would have been marks and there were none. And 
then finally, there's another 87 feet where it finally 
came to rest from the marks that were put on the road. 
And then we come back to these distances 
having to do with the vapor trail, and those are the 
numbers in the upper right-hand corner of page 2 of the 
exhibit, The distance that they have established on 
these notes is the vapor trail of the motorcycle 
started at 780 feet west, and that is by a process of 
subtraction, if my math is correct. .- And I don't claim 
page again has the railroad tracks. It has the 
point -- what Tony Evans alleges the point of impact to 
be. And then it has the distances from that point to 
where Mr. Cox was, to where the motorcycle was, to 
where the tlre marks first went onto the curb and where 
the Cadillac came to rest. 
And up in the right-hand corner of that, 
you'll also notice the vapor trial of number two, which 
is the Cadillac, vapor trail number one, which is the 
motorwcle. And vou'll all orobablv remember the 
testimdny having i o  do wiih those'vapor trails or, as 
Mr. Freeman describes it, the liquid debris. 
The third paqe of this exhibit is 
important for you on'cejou get in the jury room to 14 
discuss this accident You will notice that at the 15 
bottom of this exhibit, there is a gouge mark 16 
purporting to be where the point of impact occurred. 17 
That gouge mark corresponds with the gouge mark on the 18 
second page, which is where they allege the point of 19 
impact was, 
Coming back to the third page, this was 
measured bv Officer Corder of the ISP and Officer 
Evans. ~ r o m  the gouge mark to a point 83.1 feet 23 
downrange from that gouge mark, there are no marks, no 24 
marks. We're not talking about liquid debris or vapor 25 
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to be the qreatest mathematician. but it's 74.5 feet 
from this point of impact The vapor trail of the 
Cadillac starts at 790 feet west, and that number -- 
where have I got it here on my notes -- is 73.5 feet. 
Excuse me. IYs 79 feet. 
So how do you put this together? What's 
the meaning of that? The vapor trails and the marks 
correlate very closely. The debris field starts 
downrange from 83.1 feet. That's where the debris was 
found. We know that if the point of impact was where 
the say it is, there would be marks on the roadway by 
bot 1 vehicles, particularly the motorcycle, during that 
83.1 feet where they measured. They looked. They 
never found any. 
Thats what Brant Freeman was testifying 
about because that has to mean that the point of impact 
is down there where this 83.1 feet, that number is. He 
said that it has to be in close proximity to that 
number. That makes sense to me. 
As you look at the totality of the 
evidence of this case, the theory of this accident 
propounded by Officer Evans doesn't make sense. It 
doesn't make sense for a number of reasons, not only 
the testimony of Mr. Wood, but the marks on the roadway 
as they come across the railroad tracks. 
4R 
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I 4 eastbound lane into the westbound lane, and they look 5 identical to the marks that are in the westbound 
1 And. again, that was a puzzle to me 
2 because I believe it was Mr. Rice that said, well, 
3 these are scuff marks, the ones that come from the 
6 lane -- or excuse me --yeah, to the eastbound lane, 
7 but those are not xuff  marks, we don't know what they 
8 are. And you look at them and they look identical. 
9 And Brant Freeman testified that he looked at them and 
10 blew the pictures up, looked at them under a magnifying 





The speed doesn't make sense because 
14 what haooens with the ooint of imoad with the State is 
15 you've g i t  to elevate those speed; It's actually 71 
16 miles an hour. And Mr. Rice hedged a little bit saying 
17 it was 65, but his calculation is actually 71 miles per 
18 hour. If he was off the left edge of the roadway, in 
19 1.1 seconds, you've got to cross over across the 
20 railroad tracks and get situated in the westbound lane 
21 of traffic to directlv collide with the motorcvcle. I 
22 suppose that's poisible, but the probability'of it, of 
23 that occurring, you know, it just isn't there. That 1;; doesn't make sense. 
Ladies and gentlemen, when you retire to 
AP 
accident -- or excuse me -- of the motorcycle at the 
time of the accident. There wasn't any changes. Some 
of those witnesses worked on it, but there weren't any 
changes. That's the way it was. That's the way it 
was. 
And yet when they got to the scene of 
the accident, the only thing that was found there was 
the license plate, and they took pictures of the 
license plate. We've got those photographs here. Is 
there a difference between the license plate on the 
ground and the license plate on the motorcycle? 
And when you get in the jury room and 
you look at these photographs, you will see that there 
is an acorn nut missing from the license plate and you 
will notice that that nut is missing on the bottom 
left. And you'll notice that in the photograph of the 
license plate on the ground at the sene, that nut 
that's missing is the upper right. What does that 
signify? What does that mean? 
I f  you look at this -- let me try and 
explain it as best I can. When it was first 
photographed, as I understand it, it was face down, the 
numbers were face down. That license plate was 
originally paft of a -- there was a bracket that is 
part of the unit that fits the taillight, the taillight 
r, 
1 the jury room, you bring with you your common sense and 
2 your experience, what makes sense to you. And I submit 
3 that, at least to me, what makes sense is not the 
4 theory of the accident that Officer Evans came up with. 
5 That just doesn't make sense to me at all. 
6 I f  Brant Freeman is correct and the 
7 point of impact is downrange from where they got it to 
8 the close proximi of 83.1 feet, that significantly el' 9 reduces the spe of the vehicles. That is reasonable 
10 doubt. 
11 A number of years ago I was In a trial, 
12 and I thought the case was one of those slam-dunk 
13 cases, there isn't any way in the world that you can 
14 lose it. And I was taught a lesson by a very good 
15 trial lawyer, one of the better ones in Idaho, and he 
16 said that in the course of a trial, there is usually 
17 something that occurs, probably that seems to be 
18 insignificant, but as you analyze it, it really 
19 determines what really is the case. 
20 And so since then, I have sort of paid 
21 attention to that, and I think there's such a thing in 
22 this case, and I'm going to start with this. This is 
23 the motorcycle, It's the pre-accident motorcycle. You 
24 listened to all the witnesses testify that, as far as 
25 they knew, this was an identical representation of the 
50 
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housing, and there is a piece of steel that fits on 
the -- that would fit on the back of the license plate 
which supports and provides protection and support to 
the license plate. 
We all know how flimsy license plates 
are. But this piece of steel encapsulates the license 
plate, and it is that piece of steel to which these 
bolts that I've indicated to you from the other 
photograph, that's mounted to the bracket that is part 
of that taillight housing, and that's what attaches 
them all together. 
It's obvious that that license plate was 
broken. It was broken away from the taillight. Well, 
when did that occur? It did not occur when this 
accident happened, I t  occurred sometime prior to that. 
It occurred sometime between August 16 when that 
photograph was taken and the time of the accident. 
And then let me bring you back to Scott 
Paulson's testimony, Scott Paulson testified that he 
and Mr. Cox were together and they had a runin with 
another guy on a motorcycle. They took their 
motorcycle and chased that guy down, cornered him, and 
there was an altercation. He testified that there was 
damage done to the motorcycles. He testified there was 
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1 there was a dent in the fuel tank. He did not testify 
2 that there was damage done to the taillight, but it 
3 certainlv could have occurred then. But, ladies and 
MS. BOND: The State in this case had no 
intention of ieaving out number seven --this is why we 
get the last word here -- because number seven is all 
about Ted Cox. That's what this case is about. That's 
what we're going to focus on here once again in our 
rebuttal is number seven, It sums it all up because 
Mr. Harris didn't give you the whole picture either. 
Let's put it down here in totality. And 
the defendant's, which is Mr. McKay, operation of the 
motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox, a human 
being. He did cause the death of Ted Cox. That's 
exactly what this case is about. I'm glad he pointed 
that out for me because that is the most important 
element exactly, dead on. 
Ted Cox had a life and he had a family 
and he deserved to live. He was killed by a driver 
that was under the influence of alcohol, You heard it, 
this is an accident. This is no accident. This is 
willful conduct. 
We should rely on the testimony of an 
expert who hasn't had any updated training for fourteen 
years, who is paid a large amount of money to come up 
with a theory that fits for Mr. McKay, an expert that 
didn't come up with any numbers, didn't do computations 
for you, an expert whose attention to detail is quite 
CE 
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6 are cknged, 
7 I f  you'll remember the testimony of all 
8 the witnesses -- well, most of the witnesses anyway -- 
9 there is no lens glass from the taillight on the ground 
10 or anywhere at the scene of the accident. I f  you look 
11 at the metal, and they describe it as being pot metal, 
12 probably is, but that is a large piece of metal that 
13 houses that taillight. None of that metal was found. 
14 Officer Evans testified he searched for hours trying to 
15 find it. He didn't find it, Why didn't he find it? 
16 The license plate was there. That taillight and that 
17 housing was not there. There was not a taillight on 
18 the Cox motorcycle that night. 
19 I don't know when the damage to it 
20 occurred. I t  certainly could have occurred when Scott 
21 Pauison and he had the altercation with the other guy 
22 on September 20th. I t  could be that they ordered 
23 another one in and i t  hadn't arrived yet so they hadn't 
24 put it on and they attached the license plate with a 
25 wire or something because he was driving around. But 
53 
1 the taillight was not there. And as Mr, Freeman 
2 testified, you can't yield to what you can't see. 
3 And if you come back to cause -- see, 
4 that's number seven on the board that the prosecutor 
5 leR out --what was the cause? The cause was no 
6 taillight, He couldn't see it. Mr. Cox was driving. 
7 We know that he had a -19 at the time of the accident. 
8 Was that a contributor, the fact that he was driving 
9 out there without a taillight? In  my judgment, 
10 certainly. 
11 Ladies and gentlemen, reasonable doubt 
12 has been shown, There is reasonable doubt in this 
13 case, I recognize, and Mr. McKay and his family 
14 recognize, how tragic and unfortunate this situation 
15 is. But, ladies and gentlemen, it was an accident. 
16 I ask you to return a verdict of not 
17 guilty because the State has not met its burden of 
18 proof, and the only way justice will be accomplished in 
19 this case is by a return of not guilty. 
20 Again, I thank you so much for your 
21 attention, for your time that you've spent, that you've 
22 given in considering this matter, Thank you very much. 
23 ME COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harris. 
24 ********** 25 
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evident from the affidavit, that's who we're supposed 
to rely on? 
And for some reason, he knew there was 
no taillight? Whose fault is it that that taillight's 
gone? The car hits it full speed, almost 70 miles per 
hour, and it's gone and that's Ted's fault? There was 
a screw found by Ed Robertson and the other mechanic in 
the fender with a piece of pot metal on it with a fresh 
break. Remember that testimony. Remember that 
testimony because that's important, A fresh break, pot 
metal, explodes, a huge crash, lots of power. That was 
not Ted's fault. Ted was not driving the Cadillac. 
Mr. McKay was driving the Cadillac. He was driving the 
Cadillac after he had drinks and he was driving fast. 
This is also what this case is about. 
It's about the obvious. Well, they didn't do an 
autopsy. Let's take a look at this. It's real small 
here, but not really when you get this picture. You 
will see this right here. That's what's left of 
Mr. Cox, That's a piece of brain matter that's along 
the highway. Let's not look at the obvious, Let's 
look at the little tiny detail. 
They're asking you to speculate that 
there's no taillight so there's no responsibility here. 
Do we want to decide this case based on speculation or 
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STATE OF IDAHO v. 
APPEAL AUGMENT 
1 do we want to decide this case based on fact, a fact 
2 like depicted here, a fact like brain matter, a fact 
3 like a license plate shoved all the way into this 
4 motorcycle that Tony had to pull out of there, facts 
5 like a gouge mark, which is a mark, it's a mark prior 
6 to 83 feet? 
7 We're trying to manipulate the facts 
8 here, manipulating the information? Every one of the 
9 State's experts had numbers, they had credentials. 
10 They do this work currently. They are up to date, 
11 They teach others. They have a law enforcement 
12 background and training and it's current. 
13 He has an expert that says it's police 
14 policy to seize vehicles, which both officers said it's 
15 not the case. They don't keep these vehicles unless 
16 requested by the prosecutor's office. 
17 And intent, act and intent. Another 
18 good point made by Mr, Harris because the act here, the 
19 act of how he drove that vehicle, running off the road 
20 out of control, coming back onto the road at a high 
21 rate of speed. Sure, the car's a good car. It could 
22 have made it, but the driver wasn't capable. The 
23 driver was impaired. Reckless conduct slamming into 
24 the back of Ted Cox. The act itself is indicative of 
25 what the intent was, Mr. McKay -- made the choices here. 
1 punished, And in this case, a -15 is quite indicative 
2 of over the legal limit. 
3 Number seven is the crux of this case 
4 because Ted Cox is the one that paid the price here. 
5 The State is going to ask you to return a guilty 
6 verdict for Mr. McKay. Thank you. 
7 
1 He made the choices to drink and drive and drive f a 9  
2 not Ted Cox. 
3 I want to address Steve Woods again once 
4 more. Steve Woods was looking at the motorcycles -- 
5 this is his testimony -- and when he looked up, he saw 
6 the car halfway into his lane. Completely consistent 
7 with the State's theory in this case. 
8 They want you to believe that the 
9 splatters and where the vehicles hit are clear down 
10 here because it lessens the speed, of course, but does 
11 that really make sense? I mean, you saw it right here 
12 in court. Those fluids are not going to fall down if a 
13 car is moving --let me see if I can get it right. 
14 Every second i t  moves 90 feet if it's going 60 miles 
15 per hour. That's qulte a force. That's quite a push. 
16 It's taking it down the road a way before it dumps it, 
17 and that only makes sense. We saw it happen here in 
18 court with the cup. So really, blowvitating? Who's 
19 blowvitating here? 
20 We want fact, we want the truth because 
21 that's what justice is about, and Ted deserves it. He 
22 deserves the truth and he deserves justice and so does 
23 everybody else in society. I f  somebody takes everybody 
24 else's life on the road into their hands and dares to 
25 go out and drive under the influence, they should be 
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State v. McNairIdalio App.,2005. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Hugh S. McNAIR, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 30109. 
Jan. 10,2005. 
Review Denied March 10,2005. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in a 
jury trial in the District Court, Fourth 
Judicial District, Valley County, Georae 
David Carey, J., and Henrv R. Boomer. 111; 
Magistrate, of misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, a, 
J., held that: 
negligence on part of defendant was 
required element of vehicular manslaughter; 
criminal complaint was not 
jurisdictionally defective for not alleging 
that defendant's failure to maintain his lane 





48AVIIIA) In General 
48Ak342 Homicide 
48Ak344 k. Manslaughter. 
Most Cited Cases 
Negligence on part of defendant was 
required element of vehicular manslaughter. 
I.C. 6 18-4006, subd. 3(c). 
J2J Statutes 361 -181(1) 
361 Statutes -
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of 
Construction 
361k180 Intention of Legislature 
361k181 In General 
361k181(1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 -184 
361 Statutes -
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of 
Construction 
361kl80 Intention of Legislature 
361k184 k. Policy and Purpose 
of Act. Most Cited Cases 
(3J jury instructions were erroneous for not Statutes 361 -208 
requiring finding that defendant was 
negligent before he could be found guilty of - 361 Statutes 
vehicular manslaughter. Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of 
Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and 
Vacated and remanded. Intrinsic Aids to Construction 
West Headnotes 361k208 k. Context and Related 
Automobiles 48A -344 Clauses. Most Cited Cases 
When a court must engage in statutory 
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construction, its duty is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature; in so 
doing, appellate court looks to the context of 
the statutory language in question and the 
public policy behind the statute. 
j3J Statutes 361 -223.2(.5) 
361 Statutes -
361VI Construction and Operation -
361VI(A) General Rules of 
Construction 
361k223 Construction with 
Reference to Other Statutes 
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to 
the Same Subject Matter in General 
3611<223.2(.5) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
When an ambiguous statute is part of a 
larger statutory scheme, appellate court not 
only focuses upon the language of the 
ambiguous statute, but appellate court also 
looks at other statutes relating to the same 
subject matter and consider them together in 
order to discern legislative intent; even when 
a statute is not ambiguous on its face, 
judicial construction might nevertheless be 
required to harmonize the statute with other 
legislative enactments on the same subject. 
Ifll Statutes 361 -241(1) 
361 Statutes -
Construction and Operation 
361VICB) Particular Classes of 
Statutes 
361k241 Penal Statutes 
361k24111) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
When a court must engage in statutory 
construction, appellate court is obligated to 
apply the doctrine of lenity, which requires 
courts to construe ambiguous criminal 
statutes in favor of the accused. 
Page 2 




48Ak35 1 Charging Instrument; 
Summons or Ticket 
48Ak351.1 k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Criminal complaint was not jurisdictionally 
defective for not alleging that defendant's 
failure to maintain his lane of travel was 
product of negligent act or omission in 
vehicular manslaughter prosecution; 
although complaint stating that defendant 
slid his vehicle into oncoming northbound 
lane was defective for failure to allege any 
negligence or other culpable mental state, 
both the first and second alternatives in 
complaint that defendant drove carelessly, 
imprudently or inattentively and drove at 
speed greater than was reasonable and 
prudent under conditions made clear 
references to negligence. LC. 6 18-4006, 
subd. 3(c). 
Indictment and Information 210 
-60 
210 Indictment and Information -
210V Requisites and Sufficiency of -
Accusation 
210k58 Subject-Matter of Allegations 
k. Elements and Incidents 
of Offense in General. Most Cited Cases 
A charging document will be deemed so 
flawed that it fails to confer jurisdiction on 
the court if the facts alleged are not made 
criminal by statute or if the document fails 
to state facts essential to establish the 
offense charged. 
Criminal Law 110 -1032(5) 
110 Criminal Law -
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Trial 
1 lOXX(G1 Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k772 Elements and Incidents of 
Offense, and Defenses in General 
110k772(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
A trial court must charge the jury with all 
rules of law material to the determination of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence; therefore, 
the jury must be instructed on all elements 
of the charged offense. 
1121 Criminal Law 110 -778(5) 
1 10 Criminal Law -
1 1 OXX Trial 
1 lOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k778 ~resumbtions and Burden 
of Proof 
110k778(5) k. Shifting Burden 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
The omission of an element of the crime 
impermissibly lightens the prosecution's 
burden of proof. 
1131 Criminal Law 110 -1181.5(1) 
1 10 Criminal Law -
1 1 OXXIV Review 
1 IOXXIV(U) Determination and 
Disposition of Cause 
1 10k1181.5 Remand in General; 
Vacation 
110kl181.5(1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
When it is not possible to determine whether 
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or 
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court 
must vacate the conviction and remand the 
case for a new trial. 
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appellant. Thomas A. Sullivan argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attomey 
General; Melissa Nicole Moody, Deputy 
Attomey General, Boise, for respondent. 
Melissa Nicole Moody argued. 
LANSING, Judge. 
*264 Appellant Hugh S. McNair was 
convicted of misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter. The issues he raises on 
appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the 
criminal complaint and the jury instructions, 
require that we determine whether 
negligence on the part of the defendant is an 
element of vehicular manslaughter under 
Idaho Code 6 18-4006(3)(c). We hold that 
it is and therefore vacate the judgment and 
remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
On the evening of February 9, 2001, Hugh 
S. McNair was driving southbound on 
Highway 55 between McCall and Boise in 
wintry conditions. As he started to 
negotiate a curve, McNair's vehicle crossed 
into the opposite lane and collided head-on 
with another vehicle. Injuries from the 
collision resulted in the death of Reed 
Ostermeier, the passenger in the other 
vehicle. McNair was charged with 
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, 
18-4006(3)(~). 
The second amended complaint, upon which 
McNair went to trial, alleged: 
That the defendant, HUGH S. MCNAIR ... 
did, unlawfully but without malice kill Reed 
Elvin Ostermeier, a human being, by 
operating a motor vehicle ... in the 
c ~ m m i s ~ o n  f an unlawful act or acts, not 
**411 Wiebe & Fouser, Caldwell, for amounting to a felony, without gross 
O 2007 Thomson~West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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negligence, to wit; the defendant was 
driving southbound at said location, 
carelessly, imprudently or inattentively by 
not paying attention and/or at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under 
the conditions or when approaching an 
intersection and curve or failing to observe 
special hazards that may be in existence by 
reasons of weather or highway conditions 
that caused him to apply his brakes, locking 
up his wheels and/or sliding his vehicle into 
the oncoming northbound lane striking the 
vehicle driven by Heidi M. Ostermeier 
killing Reed Elvin Ostermeier. 
All of which is a misdemeanor in violation 
Page 5 
FNI. McNair also asserts that the 
magistrate imposed an excessive 
sentence, an issue that we do not 
reach. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Negligence as an Element of Vehicular 
Manslaughter 
of Idaho Code 18-4006(3)(c), and *265 
**412 against the peace, power and dignity Both McNair's claim that the complaint 
of the State of Idaho. was jurisdictionally defective and his claim 
of error in the iurv instructions reauire that 
At trial, the defense theory was that we determine - whether Gehicular 
McNair's vehicle hit a patch of ice on the manslaughter may be a strict liability 
road as he was entering a curve, which offense or requires some degree of 
caused his vehicle to skid into the other lane negligence. Although the State conceded 
despite McNair's exercise of due care. before the district court that negligence is an 
McNair was nevertheless found guilty by the element of the offense, it now argues to the 
jury. contrary. 
McNair's conviction and sentence were 
affirmed by the district court on intermediate 
appeal. On further appeal to this Court, 
McNair argues that (1) the criminal 
complaint was jurisdictionally defective 
because it did not adequately allege that 
McNair was negligent; and (2) the 
magistrate failed to properly instruct the jury 
that negligence is an element of vehicular 
m a n s l a ~ g h t e r . ~  Both of these issues relate 
to the State's allegation that McNair caused 
the victim's death by "sliding his vehicle 
into the oncoming northbound lane striking 
the vehicle driven by Heidi Ostermeier ...." 
Neither that portion of the amended 
complaint nor the related jury instruction 
expressly incorporated an element o f  
negligence. 
On the date of the accident, vehicular 
manslaughter was defined in LC. 6 18- 
4006(3)fc) as follows: 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a 
human being without malice. It is of three 
(3) kinds: 
.... 
3. Vehicular-in which the operation of a 
motor vehicle is a significant cause 
contributing to the death because oE 
(a) the commission of an unlawful act, not 
amounting to a felony, with gross 
negligence; or 
(b) the commission of a violation of section 
18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) the commission of an unlawfhl act, not 
amounting to a felony, without gross 
negligence.m 
O 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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FN2. This statute was amended in 
2002 to include a human embryo or 
fetus in the definition of a human 
being. 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 
350 2. 
McNair was charged under subpart (c) 
which, on its face, does not include an 
element of negligence, but requires only an 
"unlawful act" that significantly contributes 
to the cause of death. The State contends 
that McNair committed an "unlawful act" 
when his vehicle crossed the center line, and 
even if it occurred without his negligence, 
he is guilty of vehicular manslaughter. m.2 
McNair argues that the Idaho courts have 
interpreted LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c) to include 
an element of negligence and that, if the 
statute is interpreted to create a strict 
liability offense, it would violate the 
constitutional right of due process. 
FN3. Presumably, the unlawful act to -
which the State refers is a violation 
of LC. 6 6 49-630, .19-631 and/or 
49-637. Implicit in the State's 
argument is the proposition that 
these statutes prohibiting driving to 
the left of the center line create 
criminal liability even if the driver 
was exercising due care. That is a 
proposition that we need not address. 
When a court must engage in 
statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. State v. Shanks. 139 Idaho 152, 
154.75 P.3d 206,208 (Ct.App.2003). In so 
doing, we look to the context of the statutory 
language in question and the public policy 
behind the statute. Id.; State v. Cudd, 137 
Idaho 625. 627. 51 P.3d 439. 441 
(Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous statute 
is part of a larger statutory scheme, we not 
only focus upon the language of the 
ambiguous statute, but also look at other 
statutes relating to the same "266 ""413 
subject matter and consider them together in 
order to discern legislative intent. Shanks, 
139 Idaho at 154. 75 P.3d at 208: State v. 
Paciorek. 137 Idaho 629, 632, 51 P.3d 443, 
446 (Ct.App.2002). Even when a statute is 
not ambiguous on its face, "judicial 
construction might nevertheless be required 
to harmonize the statute with other 
legislative enactments on the same subject." 
Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 106, 785 
P.2d 667, 670 (Ct.App.1989). We also are 
obligated to apply the doctrine of lenity, 
which requires courts to construe ambiguous 
criminal statutes in favor of the accused. 
State v. Wees. 138 Idaho 119, 124, 58 P.3d 
103. 108 (Ct.Apv.2002); State v. Dewey, 
131 Idaho 846. 848. 965 P.2d 206, 208 
(Ct.Apv.1998). 
An analysis of the mental element (if any) 
for vehicular manslaughter under §..-l& 
4006(3Mc) requires consideration of not 
only the language of that statute, but also of 
two additional statutes. One of those is the 
excusable homicide statute, LC. 6 18-4012, 
which provides: 
Homicide is excusable in the following 
cases: 
1. When committed by accident and 
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful 
means, with usual and ordinary caution, and 
without any unlawful intent. 
2. When committed by accident and 
misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any 
sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a 
sudden combat when no undue advantage is 
taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and 
when the killing is not done in a cruel or 
unusual manner. 
@ 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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The other is LC. 6 18-201 ( 3 ,  which 
provides:All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging 
to the following classes: 
.... 
3. Persons who committed the act or made 
the omission charged, through misfortune or 
by accident, when it appears that there was 
not evil design, intention or culpable 
negligence. 
In our view, 6 6 18-4012 and 18-201 
collectively express a legislative intent that 
there is no criminal homicide when a death 
occurs through an accident and entirely 
without any negligence or other culpable 
behavior. 
Although there are no previous Idaho 
decisions directly addressing the issue 
presented here, our interpretation of these 
statutes draws some support from two prior 
decisions, State v. Lona, 91 Idaho 436. 423 
P.2d 858 (19671, and Haxforth v. State, 117 
Idaho 189. 786 P.2d 580 (Ct.App.1990). In 
Long, the defendant was charged with 
involuntary manslaughter in the operation of 
an automobile under then-existing I.C. 6 
18-4006(2), which was very similar to the 
present LC. 6 18-4006(31.~ Long 
challenged the statute as being 
unconstitutionally vague. In the course of 
addressing that challenge, and ultimately 
upholding the validity of the statute, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
FN4. The statute under consideration 
in Long provided: 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing 
of a human being, without malice. 
It is of two kinds: 
1. Voluntary- .... 
2. Involuntary- ...; or in the 
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operation of a motor vehicle: 
(a) In the commission of an 
unlawful act, not amounting to a 
felony, with gross negligence; or, 
(b) In the commission of a lawful 
act which might produce death, in an 
unlawful manner, and with gross 
negligence; or, 
(c) In the commission of an 
unlawful act, not amounting to a 
felony, without gross negligence; or, 
(d) In the commission of a lawful 
act which might produce death, in an 
unlawful manner, but without gross 
negligence. 
The legislature, classified the crime on the 
basis of whether it was committed "with 
gross negligence"-a felony, or "without 
gross negligence9'-an indictable 
m i ~ d e m e a n o r . ~  Such distinction, 
considered in harmony with the provisions 
of LC. 6 18-4012, indicates that the 
legislature intended that only a degree of 
negligence (as that term is defined by 
18-101. subp. 2) less than "gross 
negligence," but of a degree which would 
disclose acts, conduct, or omissions not 
embraced within the excusable homicide 
state, i.e., "when committed by accident and 
misfortune in doing '267 **414 any lawful 
act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary 
caution, ..." would constitute a 
misdemeanor. 
FN5. The same classification exists 
under the present statutes. See LC. 
18-4007(3). 
Lona, 91 Idaho at 442.423 P.2d at 864. 
In Haxforth, the defendant had attempted to 
pass another vehicle, at a time when there 
was traffic in the oncoming lane. This 
O 2007 ThomsoMest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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maneuver, which violated I.C. 6 49-634, 
caused the death of a passenger in an 
oncoming vehicle. The State charged 
Haxforth with misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter, alleging not gross negligence 
but ordinary negligence. Following his 
conviction, Haxforth brought a petition for 
post-conviction relief, asserting, among 
other things, that LC. 6 18-201 precluded 
his conviction because even if he was 
negligent, he was not "culpably negligent." 
In rejecting that argument, this Court stated: 
Idaho Code 6 18-201 states that a person is 
incapable of committing a crime if he 
"committed the act ... through misfortune or 
by accident, when it appears that there was 
not evil design, intention or culpable 
negligence." (Emphasis added.) In Statev. 
Lonp, 91 Idaho 436.443.423 P.2d 858,865 
(1967) our Supreme Court determined that 
the reference to "culpable negligence" is 
simply a reiteration of the excusable 
homicide standard under LC. 6 18-4012. It 
does not preclude imposition of criminal 
responsibility for negligence under the 
vehicular manslaughter statute. In essence, 
we understand Long to mean that negligence 
in committing an unlawful act, resulting in 
death, is "culpable negligence." Therefore, 
we conclude that Haxforth is not shielded by 
LC. 6 18-201. 
Haxforth, 117 Idaho at 191. 786 P.2d at 582. 
It is implicit in these comments that 
commission of an act (even if it is unlawful 
under a strict liability statute) that involves 
no negligence at all would not satisfy the 
"culpable negligence" requirement of 
section 18-201 and therefore would not 
support a conviction for vehicular 
manslaughter. 
The State incorrectly contends that the 
above passage shows that the Haxforth 
Court "interpreted any negligence 
Page 8 
requirement in the misdemeanor 
manslaughter statute to require nothing more 
than an unlawful act resulting in death." To 
the contrary, Haxforth says that, "negligence 
in committing an unlawful act" is culpable 
negligence. Id. (emphasis added). 
Having concluded that Idaho law requires a 
culpable mental state of at least simple 
negligence before an individual may be 
convicted of vehicular manslaughter, we 
must determine whether the criminal 
complaint and the jury insh-uctions in 
McNair's case adequately addressed this 
element of the offense. 
FN6. Because we conclude that LC. 
4 6 18-201 and 18-4012 together 
require a culpable mental state of at 
least negligence, we need not address 
McNair's argument that such a 
requirement is mandated by the 
constitutional guarantee of due 
process. 
B. The Criminal Complaint Was Not 
Jurisdictionally Defective 
McNair contends that the criminal 
complaint was insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction upon the court because it did not 
allege that his failure to maintain his lane of 
travel was the product of a negligent act or 
omission and, hence, did not allege all of the 
elements of vehicular manslaughter. The 
State contends that because the charge was a 
misdemeanor, it was not necessary to allege 
the specific facts of the offense. Without 
reaching the State's contention, we conclude 
that the complaint was not jurisdictionally 
defective. 
The second amended complaint identified at 
least three alternative unlawful acts which 
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allegedly were committed by McNair and 
caused the death of the victim: (1) driving 
"ccarlessly, imprudently or inattentively" 
and/or (2) driving "at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions" and/or (3) "sliding his vehicle 
into the oncoming northbound lane." 
McNair does not challenge the sufficiency 
of the allegations with respect to the first 
two of these but contends that, because the 
acts are pleaded in the alternative, the 
omission of any allegation of negligence 
with respect to the third act of sliding into 
the oncoming lane makes the complaint 
insufficient to allege an offense and, hence, 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the 
court. 
**415 268171r81 A charging document will 
be deemed so flawed that it fails to confer 
jurisdiction on the court if the facts alleged 
are not made criminal by statute or if the 
document fails to state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged. State v. 
Maver, 139 Idaho 643. 646, 84 P.3d 579. 
582 (Ct.Apu.2004); State v. Bvinpton, 135 
Idaho 621, 21 P.3d 943 (Ct.Auu.2001). If 
an alleged deficiency is raised by a 
defendant before trial or entry of a guilty 
plea, the charging document must state all 
facts essential to establish the charged 
offense, State v. Halbesleben. 139 Idaho 
165, 168, 75 P.3d 219. 222 (Ct.Apu.2003); 
Bvinpton, 135 Idaho at 623. 21 P.3d at 945; 
but if the information is not challenged until 
after a verdict or guilty plea, "it will be 
liberally construed in favor of validity, and a 
technical deficiency that does not prejudice 
the defendant will not vrovide a basis to set 
the conviction aside." Halbesleben. 139 
Idaho at 168, 75 P.3d at 222: State v. 
Cahoon, 116 Idaho 399,400,775 P.2d 1241, 
1242 (1989); State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 
285, 287, 805 P.2d 491. 493 (Ct.Auu.1991). 
Thus, if the challenge is tardy, the charging 
document will be upheld on appeal "unless 
it is so defective that it does not, by any fair 
or reasonable construction, charge an 
offense for which the defendant was 
convicted." Halbesleben. 139 Idaho at 168, 
75 P.3d at 222. See also Robran. 119 Idaho 
at 287.805 P.2d at 493. 
Because the liberality we use in construing 
the complaint depends upon the timing of 
McNair's claim that it was jurisdictionally 
defective, it is necessary to review the 
relevant procedural history. The State's 
original complaint was amended, and the 
first amended complaint charged that on the 
date in question McNair "did, unlawfully 
but without malice kill Reed Elvin 
Ostermeier, a human being, by operating a 
motor vehicle ... in the commission of an 
unlawful act or acts, not amounting to a 
felony, without gross negligence, wherein, 
his vehicle went into the oncoming lane of 
traffic and struck the [Ostermeier] 
vehicle ...." Shortly afterward, McNair 
moved to dismiss this amended complaint, 
contending that the conduct alleged to have 
constituted the underlying "unlawful act" 
was consistent with lawful operation of a 
motor vehicle. The State then filed the 
second amended complaint that we have 
heretofore quoted. The court minutes from 
the hearing on the motion to dismiss show 
that defense counsel told the court that he 
was satisfied that the second amended 
complaint resolved the objections raised in 
the motion, and the magistrate therefore 
found the motion to dismiss to be moot. 
Now, following McNair's conviction, he 
contends for the first time that the second 
amended complaint was jurisdictionally 
defective. We therefore exercise 
"considerable leeway to imply the necessary 
allegations," Robran. 119 Idaho at 287, 805 
P.2d at 493, and will find the pleading 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction only if it 
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does not "by any fair or reasonable underlying unlawful act and the 
construction, charge the offense for which second alternative was apparently 
the defendant was convicted." Halbesleben. refemng to a violation of Idaho's 
139 Idaho at 168.75 P.3d at 222. basic speed rule, LC. 6 49-654(1). 
McNair points out that, "sliding his vehicle 
into the oncoming northbound lane" is 
alleged as an independent, alternative 
unlawful act upon which he could be 
convicted for vehicular manslaughter. He 
argues that because the phrase did not 
include an allegation that he was negligent, 
this alternate theory of criminal liability was 
invalid, and that the entire complaint was 
therefore insufficient to allege the offense. 
Having concluded above that a culpable 
mental state of at least negligence is 
required under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c), we 
agree with McNair that the third alternative, 
"and/or sliding his vehicle into the 
oncoming northbound lane," was defective 
for failure to allege any negligence or other 
culpable mental state. It does not follow, 
however, that the amended complaint is 
jurisdictionally insufficient merely because 
the third alternative is infirm. Both the first 
and second alternatives made clear 
references to negligence, by using such 
words and phrases as, "carelessly," 
"imprudently," "inattentively," "not paying 
attention," and "at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the 
FN7 McNair does not conditions." -
cballenge*269 **416 the sufficiency of the 
first and second alternatives. Because the 
first two alternatives were sufficient to 
describe an offense, we conclude that the 
second amended complaint as a whole was 
adequate to confer jurisdiction on the court. 
FN7. The first alternative was 
apparently refemng to inattentive 
driving, LC. 6 49-1401(3), as the 
C. Jury Instructions 
J'9J We next address McNair's contention 
that the jury instructions were erroneous 
because they did not require a finding that 
McNair was negligent before he could be 
found guilty of vehicular manslaughter 
under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c). 
[loll1 11r121 When reviewing jury 
instructions, we ask whether the instructions 
as a whole, and not individually, fairly and 
accurately reflect applicable law. State v. 
Alsanea. 138 Idaho 733. 743. 69 P.3d 153. 
163 (Ct.Apv.2003); State v. Bowman, 124 
Idaho 936. 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 
[Ct.Avp.1993). A trial court must charge 
the jury with all rules of law material to the 
determination of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence. LC. 6 19-21321a); State v. 
Fetterlv, 126 Idaho 475, 476. 886 P.2d 780, 
781 (Ct.Avv.1994). Therefore, the jury 
must be instructed on all elements of the 
charged offense. Halbesleben. 139 Idaho at 
168-69, 75 P.3d at 222-23: State v. Crowe, 
135 Idaho 43, 47. 13 P.3d 1256. 1260 
(Ct.Apv.2000). The omission of an element 
of the crime impermissibly lightens the 
prosecution's burden of proof. Id. 
McNair contends that Instruction 3 required 
the jury to convict him even if it found that 
he was not negligent during the events 
leading up to the collision. That instruction 
said: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of 
Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about February 9,2001 
2. in the state of Idaho 
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3. the defendant Hugh S. NcNair, while 
operating a motor vehicle committed one or 
more of the following acts; 
(a) Inattentive driving; and/or 
(b) Operating his motor vehicle in violation 
of Idaho's Basis Rule; and/or 
(c) Failing to maintain lane of travel. 
4. the defendant's operation of the motor 
vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Reed Ostermeier: 
You are further instructed that the unlawful 
act or acts are committed when one or all of 
the following occurred: 
(a) The defendant drove his vehicle 
inattentively, carelessly or imprudently, in 
light of the circumstances then existing; 
andlor 
(b) The defendant drove his motor vehicle in 
violation of Idaho's Basic Rule by driving at 
a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing or by failing to drive at a safe 
and appropriate speed when approaching 
and going around a curve or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions; and/or 
(c) The defendant, while driving his motor 
vehicle, failed to maintain his lane of travel. 
If the state has failed to prove paragraphs 1 
through 4, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty. If you unanimously find that the 
state has proven paragraphs 1 through 4, 
including at least one of the components of 
the unlawful act or acts as stated in 3(a) or 
@) or (c) beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant guilty of 
vehicular manslaughter. 
This instruction, argues McNair, directed the 
jury to convict him based solely upon his 
failure to maintain his lane of travel, even if 
such failure was not a product of negligence. 
We agree. Application of parts 3(c) and 
4(c) of the instruction required the jury to 
find McNair guilty if the collision was 
caused by McNair's failure to maintain his 
lane of travel, irrespective of negligence or 
other fault. 
The State contends that any deficiency in 
Instruction 3 was cured by Instruction 3A, 
which was based upon LC. 6 18-201(3), and 
which stated: 
All persons are capable of committing 
crimes, except those belonging to the 
following classes: 
.... 
**417 "270 3. Persons who committed the 
act or made the omission charged, through 
misfortune or by accident, when it appears 
that there was not evil design, intention or 
culpable negligence. 
We are not persuaded that this instruction 
cured the flaw in Instruction 3. The two 
instructions may well have led to jury 
confusion because they contradicted one 
another. Instruction 3 told the jurors that if 
they found McNair caused the victim's death 
by failing to maintain his lane of travel 
while driving, they "must find the defendant 
guilty of vehicular manslaughter." 
Instruction 3A, on the other hand, implied 
that McNair would not be guilty if he was 
not negligent. A juror who believed the 
defense theory, that McNair's vehicle left the 
lane of travel but that it was not due to any 
negligence on McNair's part, would be hard- 
pressed to determine what effect to give to 
Instruction 3A when Instruction 3 required a 
guilty verdict. 
1131 The instructions did not preclude the 
jury from finding McNair guilty without any 
finding of negligence or other culpability. 
When it is not possible to determine whether 
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or 
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court 
must vacate the conviction and remand the 
case for a new trial. State v. Luke. 134 
Q 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410 
(Cite as: 141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410) 
Idaho 294,301, 1 P.3d 795,802 (2000). 
CONCLUSION 
The second amended complaint in this case 
was sufficient to allege an offense on two of 
the three legal theories alleged, and it 
therefore was sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court. However, the jury 
instructions were deficient because they did 
not require the State to prove a culpable 
mental state amounting to at least simple 
negligence. Therefore, the judgment of 
conviction is vacated and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge Pro Tem 
BEVAN concur. 
Idaho App.,2005. 
State v. McNair 
141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d410 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Page 12 
O 2007 ThomsonANest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
0464Pa36 
